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abstract
Development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argues that democracies, by 
virtue of mechanisms of accountability, are better able to avert famines than non-dem-
ocratic regimes. Using empirical evidence from colonial and independent India, Sen 
argues for the existence of an anti-famine political contract, between the government 
and its supporters, predicated on the prevention of famine. Building on this theory, 
Sen later tested his argument using cases in Africa. While Sen’s theory accurately pre-
dicts the outcomes, the causal mechanism he uses to explain each variation is falsifiable. 
In studying the experiences of each African country that succumbed to famine in the 
1980s, I find that a free press and competitive elections are neither necessary nor suffi-
cient conditions for a country to avert famine. The results presented in this paper ques-
tion the presence and role of other causes contributory to famine prevention efforts, as 
well as the possibility of anti-famine commitments within less-than-democratic polities.
INTRODUCTION
Despite modern advances in the production and distribution of food, episodes of hunger and food insecurity still occur in many of the 
world’s least developed countries. Though “hunger 
is not a modern malady,” as Jean Drèze and Amartya 
Sen (1989:3) remind us, it is recurrent in parts of the 
world, and no civilization is totally immune. During 
the twentieth century, endemic famine was all but 
eliminated from regions outside Africa, and even 
within the continent, there has been considerable 
variation. While certain countries have managed to 
avoid famine, others have succumbed repeatedly. 
Although many theories attempt to answer this 
question, perhaps the best-known explanation comes 
from Amartya Sen, who argues that “with a relatively 
free press, with periodic elections, and with active 
opposition parties, no government can escape severe 
penalty if it delays preventive measures and permits a 
real famine to occur. That threat keeps governments 
on their toes.”1 Democracies, Sen argues, are better 
equipped to prevent famines than non-democratic 
governments, which may be less responsive to the 
demands of the people. However, this argument is 
problematic for several reasons.
First, while Sen’s argument does accurately 
predict the outcome of various African countries’ 
famine prevention efforts, in each case, the influence 
of their free press and competitive elections was less 
than clear. Additionally, in each case, the country’s 
political, economic, and other circumstances were 
different than those in India, on whose experience 
Sen’s argument was originally based. Sen’s theory 
stems from China and colonial India, both of which 
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succumbed to famine, in comparison with post-
independence India, which has avoided famine.
Second, despite the predictive accuracy of Sen’s 
theory, in each African case, the reality is slightly 
different from what Sen claims. For example, while 
Sen uses Ethiopia and Sudan as examples of countries 
that experienced famine, and had neither competitive 
elections nor a free press, this does not tell the 
whole story. In the early stages of Ethiopia’s 1983-85 
famine, the dictatorial government did not suppress 
information about the impending crisis, with a 
brief exception coming during a time of national 
celebration—the tenth anniversary of the fall of Haile 
Selassie.i Rather, clear predictions were published 
about the food shortage, but were ignored by Western 
governments and the UN, due to the country’s 
domestic politics. Sudan also descended into famine 
under an authoritarian government, and though 
between 1986 and 1989 the country experienced a 
free press and competitive elections, these were not 
enough to diminish or eliminate famine conditions. 
In truth, the democratic government was to blame 
not only for failing to respond to the famine, but also 
for encouraging its continuation.
Table 1: Selected Cases
Table 1a: Sen’s Cases
Country Famine Democracy Press 
Freedom
Botswana No Yes Free
Ethiopia Yes No Not Free
Kenya No No Not Free
Sudan (pre-
1985)




Zimbabwe Yes No Partly Free
Table 1b: Additional Cases
Country Famine Democracy Press 
Freedom
Mozambique Yes No Not Free
Uganda (pre-
1984)
Yes Yes Partly Free
i  September 12, 1984 marked the tenth anniversary of the Dergue revolution, 
a celebration that cost the Dergue between $100 million and $200 million. By 
this point in the country’s famine, an estimated 700,000 people had already 
perished (Clay, 1984).
On the other hand, Amartya Sen and Jean 
Drèze herald Botswana and Zimbabwe as “‘positive’ 
examples of famine prevention, claiming that 
democratic accountability [was] instrumental 
in averting famine despite severe food crises.”2 
Although Zimbabwe did manage to avoid famine 
following drought in 1982, around this time the 
province of Matabeleland was subject to government 
suppression of dissidents, which included the 
strategic withholding of relief. Additionally, even 
though Zimbabwe was fairly democratic in 1982, 
the next year marked the start of a downward trend, 
and by the end of the decade, the country was 
strongly autocratic. Throughout this time, the press 
was decidedly not free. Sen’s fourth case, Botswana, 
has maintained an extended period of electoral 
democracy and has managed to avoid famine, though 
the causality is different than in the Indian case. 
Since independence, Botswana has been run by a 
single party, which has maintained its power through 
patronage networks, including relief programs. 
Throughout the decade, the country’s press was 
largely free from government intervention.
Finally, Sen considers Kenya, which managed 
to avert famine following a drought in 1983. Drèze 
and Sen attribute the government’s responsiveness 
to elected members of parliament in the face of a 
de jure one-party state, limited but significant press 
freedoms, and the threat of political instability. 
De Waal, in contrast, argues that “Kenya’s success 
in escaping famine was largely attributable to the 
political astuteness of President Daniel arap Moi, 
who recognized a rudimentary and implicit political 
contract: feed the central highlands and the cities, 
and the government will survive.”3 However, despite 
arap Moi’s apparent recognition of this political 
pressure, his regime “avoided tackling the structural 
causes of poverty and vulnerability,” and committed 
innumerable human rights violations during and 
after this time. There are also reports of interference 
in the affairs of the press by arap Moi’s regime, which 
further complicate the picture. 4,5,6
In an attempt to further clarify Sen’s thesis, I 
will also consider the experiences of Mozambique 
and Uganda, both examples of African countries 
that succumbed to famine. Mozambique, once 
a Portuguese colony, was ravaged by civil war 
from 1977 to 1992, and experienced famine twice 
throughout the 1980s: in 1983-84, from natural 
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causes, and again in 1987 from the conflict. 
Throughout the civil war, the country did not hold 
elections, and throughout the decade, the press was 
not free. Uganda also experienced famine in 1980, 
resulting from environmental, economic, and post-
conflict issues following the deposition of Idi Amin 
the previous year. In 1980, the country’s first elections 
in eighteen years were held, though they resulted in 
the reelection of Milton Obote, who was previously 
deposed by Amin in 1971. Under Obote II, as his 
second term was known, the country’s elections were 
not completely free or fair, though they were rated 
as among the most legitimate in this report and on 
the continent. While Uganda’s press was deemed 
partly free in 1980, these freedoms were tenuous and 
fluctuated throughout the decade.
A third complication with Sen’s argument 
stems from a much more fundamental question: 
for what reasons—if any—should democracy be 
supposed to have an advantage in fighting famine? 
A basic assumption of Sen’s claim is that “civil and 
political rights—to free speech, to free association, 
to elect representatives of one’s choice—contribute 
to the protection of social and economic rights—
[such as] the right to food and livelihood.”7 Indeed, 
throughout history, one of the most important 
aspects of civil and political rights has been their use 
in promoting social and economic rights. However, 
though it seems logical that citizens of a democracy 
would exploit their civil and political liberties to 
ensure their protection against famine, the reality 
is not so simple. Certainly, abuses of social and 
economic rights can and do occur in democracies, 
and often stem from a failure of related civil and 
political rights. How, then—if at all—is famine 
different?
Despite variation in each country’s response 
to the threat of famine, there is a common pattern 
across all countries. In each case, the dominant 
motivation underlying governmental attempts 
to prevent or ignore famine is that its primary 
interests—maintaining power—depend upon it. 
Thus, in some cases, there exists a political incentive 
to prevent famine. However, this incentive is by 
no means unique to democratic polities. Indeed, 
in all democratic states there exist interests and 
interest groups whose demands are not met, and an 
authoritarian government may just as easily derive 
some legitimacy from meeting certain demands of 
the populace—whether on the people’s conditions or 
the leader’s.
According to de Waal (2000), though, while 
efforts to this effect taken by autocratic or otherwise 
less-than-democratic governments may constitute an 
anti-famine program or commitment, these are mere 
privileges granted to the population by the grace of 
the ruler. Only in the context of “‘real’ democratic 
institutions,” it is argued, can an anti-famine contract 
emerge—a lasting and, crucially, enforceable solution 
to famine.8 However, while the difference between 
a repressive and a democratic government may 
be relatively easy to identify, the difference, both 
theoretical and practical, between a commitment 
and a contract is less than clear and raises further 
questions regarding the nature of political incentives 
and government responses to them.
As a result, we may extrapolate Sen’s thesis to a 
universal form: mechanisms of accountability, such 
as a free press and competitive elections, promote 
responsive governments.  Yet, the mechanisms Sen 
describes may be distinct from the institutional form 
of government or even any pre-existing institutional 
measures of accountability, which may exist without 
necessarily promoting any specific interest. It is 
apparent that neither the form of government nor 
the openness of the press significantly account for 
a government’s responsiveness to famine among its 
citizens. Instead, preventive action to famine seems 
more heavily influenced by the desire of those in 
power to preserve and perpetuate the regime, a 
motive more widely shared across regimes of all 
forms.
Having established that the presence and 
application of factors instrumental to anti-famine 
measures is independent of the form and structure of 
government, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Sen’s 
hypothesis with the experiences of African countries 
during the 1980s. In countries that experienced 
famine, what were the significant causal mechanisms? 
And in countries that avoided famine, how—if at 
all—did governmental action contribute to the effort? 
More importantly, why did the government choose to 
act?
Beyond Sen’s initial cases—Botswana, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—I have 
also included Mozambique and Uganda, both of 
which also experienced famine in the 1980s. By 
reevaluating each case, I argue that a free press and 
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competitive elections—supposed preconditions to 
averting famine—are, in reality, neither necessary 
nor sufficient in achieving this objective. While 
these mechanisms of accountability are undeniably 
important to improving the quality of governance, 
they must be considered distinct from other specific 
issues and from the political will to act.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. I first 
review Sen’s thesis over time, followed by a review of 
literature on the topics of famine, elections, and press, 
and ultimately, an elaboration of my argument. In the 
second section, I provide further background on each 
case, focusing on the countries’ political regime and 
elections, operational freedom of the press, and food 
security efforts. Finally, in the conclusion, I provide 
implications and recommendations for future action.
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Entitlements, Acquirement, and Freedom
Though Sen’s theory appears most explicitly 
in his 1990 speech, “Individual Freedom as a Social 
Commitment,” the notion that a free press and 
competitive elections could hold a government 
accountable stems from an earlier development by 
Sen: entitlements. Described as “the set of different 
alternative commodity bundles that [a] person can 
acquire through the use of various legal channels of 
acquirement open to someone in [their] position,” 
a person’s entitlements not only reflect the goods 
available to them, but also the conditions under 
which such exchanges are carried out.9 Thus, 
a person who owns and lives off their land, for 
example, will establish command over food in a very 
different way than a wage laborer who is paid in cash. 
While the former conducts an exchange with ‘nature’ 
(own-labor entitlement), the latter transacts with 
other members of society (trade-based entitlement).ii 
It is of great importance, Sen argues, that these 
differences in exchange conditions are considered in 
matters of hunger and food policy—without them, 
it is impossible to understand how people can or 
cannot acquire enough food.
As a result, Sen advocates considering 
entitlements—the means by which people acquire 
commodities, including food—in addition to the 
ii  Sen (1981) also identifies production-based and inheritance and transfer-
based entitlement relations. While the latter is generally of limited relevance 
to famine theory, the former is relevant insofar as it interacts with others’ 
trade-based entitlement prospects.
level of food produced or available. Though this 
approach does not seek to provide a complete 
explanation of famine, Sen notes that “famine reflects 
widespread failure of entitlements on the part of 
substantial sections of the population.”10 Starvation 
may be thought of as any commodity bundle that 
does not include sufficient food. Thus, a person’s 
entitlements may reduce them to starvation due to 
changes in their endowment (e.g. loss of land or labor 
power), or their ‘exchange entitlement mapping’ (e.g. 
fall in wages, rise in commodity prices, or changes in 
employment).
A few years later, Sen dramatically expanded 
the concept of entitlements by removing its 
tangible boundaries. In Individual Freedom as a 
Social Commitment (1990), Sen argues that famine 
constitutes not only a breakdown of vulnerable 
groups’ entitlements, but also violations of 
individuals’ positive freedom to survive.
Sen argues that poverty is not necessarily a 
violation of negative freedom: “A person in extreme 
poverty is not free to do many things (e.g., feeding 
his family well, staying home when riots threaten 
his life), but the poverty and consequent failure of 
positive freedom may not be due to interference 
by others.”11 Rather, poverty and famine represent 
serious violations of a person’s positive freedom to 
survive. Despite the change in language, though, Sen’s 
policy solution remains the same: focus on vulnerable 
groups’ entitlements and changes thereof. Within 
this framework, explanations of famine would take 
the form of economic and political changes that alter 
various groups’ relative economic power.
By way of these considerations, Sen argues that 
the difference between India prior to independence—
which experienced the Bengal famine of 1943—and 
India post-independence—the push for which was 
provoked by that particular famine—was not the 
formation of a famine response policy, but rather a 
willingness to invoke the policy when necessary.12
Since independence, India’s famine prevention 
measures have been used judiciously. Thus, Sen 
concludes that the government’s accountability to its 
people, made paramount by the country’s democratic 
revolution and its resulting political contract, is the 
causal factor in the country’s newfound ability to 
avert famine. This case, then, illustrates that “one set 
of freedoms—to criticize, to publish, to vote—are 
causally linked with other types of freedoms, such 
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as the freedom to escape starvation and famine 
mortality.”13
In colonial India, it was the reluctance of the 
British government to take responsibility for famine 
relief that helped discredit it and foment nationalist 
movements. Eventually, “sustained political agitation 
forced the government to take serious anti-famine 
measures, implicitly accepting a social contract.”14 
The Bengal famine of 1943 represented a significant 
breach of this contract, and independence came 
four years later. Post-colonial governments have 
continued to honor this anti-famine contract, and 
continue to be held accountable by the press and 
competitive elections.15
On the other hand, Sen considers China, 
a country that experienced no such popular 
democratic uprising. As a result of the country’s 
Great Leap Forward and the resulting social and 
economic reforms—which attempted to rapidly 
modernize the country’s economy through 
processes of industrialization and collectivization—a 
tremendous famine befell them. From 1958-61, 
between sixteen and thirty million people are 
estimated to have died, though other estimates place 
the toll even higher. 16 At this time, “the government 
faced no pressure from newspapers, which were 
controlled, or from opposition parties, which were 
absent.”17 Indeed, the Chinese government itself 
was misled by the lack of free reporting, with its own 
propaganda and party officials all competing for 
credit in Beijing, distorting or fabricating statistics 
from around the country.18
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Sen 
reformulated his theory to focus on five African 
cases: democratic Botswana and Zimbabwe and 
the questionably-democratic Kenya, which averted 
famine in the early 1980s, and authoritarian regimes 
in Sudan and Ethiopia, which succumbed to famine. 
Though Sen undoubtedly considers his theory robust 
enough to be applicable to the individual cases, there 
are important differences among the countries to 
consider that present a challenge to Sen’s hypothesis.
As in India, under colonialism, African 
governments faced little pressure to introduce 
anti-famine measures. Rather, it was only towards 
the end of the era that there arose any “sense of 
administrative responsibility towards colonial 
subjects.”19 However, before then, colonialism in the 
area was primarily exploitative and relied on military 
power. In the early twentieth century, for example, 
famine was brought about in British Tanganyika 
(later Tanzania) and German Ruanda-Urundi 
by colonial troops, in an attempt to suppress the 
populations. 20
Elsewhere in Africa, though, colonial 
administrations had begun to acknowledge famine as 
a detriment to the local population. Following famine 
and food insecurity in Sudan during the 1910s, the 
colonial government attempted to transplant the 
Indian Famine Code in the country, resulting in the 
1920 Sudan Famine Regulations. However, Sudan 
was very different than Madras, the Indian state on 
whose policies Sudan’s were based. First, there was 
not enough administrative capacity in Sudan to 
organize a system necessary to predict and prevent 
famine, let alone undertake the prescribed relief 
efforts. Second, the populations most affected by 
the famines were different. Reflective of “the generic 
difference between (most) South Asian famines and 
(most) African ones,” those most at risk of famine in 
India were agricultural laborers and rural artisans, 
while in Sudan, those most at risk were largely 
pastoralist farmers and herders.21 Crucially, while 
the fortunes of the former depended on market 
conditions (i.e. food prices and employment), the 
wealth of the latter was held primarily in assets 
such as livestock, meaning that famine in Sudan 
would be harder to predict but slower to arrive, 
reducing the advantage of responding quickly.iii 
The area’s lack of transport infrastructure and the 
absence of any food markets also meant that “the 
deference of the regulations to classical economics 
was inappropriate.”22 In reality, de Waal argues, 
the Sudanese Famine Regulations were constructed 
primarily to deter political threats by prioritizing 
subsidized food government employees and 
townspeople, followed by those in flood-prone 
riverine areas, while dwellers of more remote regions 
would be lucky to receive any assistance.
Though Sudan’s famine codes of the early 
twentieth century are notable for being somewhat 
inappropriate given their context, other African 
colonies also experienced ‘relief ’ policies that 
provided a bare minimum of assistance. While 
in certain instances, the legacies of colonial 
iii  In terms of entitlements, while the wealth of agricultural laborers and 
rural artisans is primarily trade-based (or possibly production-based), that 
of pastoralist farmers and herders is more along the lines of own-labor 
entitlements.
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administrations did help to instill an expectation 
of emergency relief provision (e.g. Tanzania), this 
was not the norm. There is thus a clear difference 
between the approaches of famine-prevention 
regimes in India and in Africa: in the former, famine 
relief had become a right, while in the latter it was 
still seen as little more than an administrative duty. 
However, the situation was different in African cities 
due to the growth of trade unions and nationalist 
sentiment, where keeping the people fed became a 
political imperative and consequently was popularly 
recognized as a responsibility of the government.
Politics of famine prevention in colonial Africa 
was further complicated by disputes regarding land 
use and soil conservation, with colonial governors 
seeing traditional techniques as backwards and 
damaging to the environment. As one might expect, 
the policies that resulted from this view generated 
resentment and resistance that significantly 
strengthened nationalist sentiments. Policies dealing 
with epidemic disease control were met with similar 
hostility, owing both to their rudimentary nature 
and the authoritarian manner in which they were 
implemented.iv
Even as African countries achieved 
independence, there were no nationalist movements 
that utilized the prevention of famine as a party 
platform. Instead, other issues like racial identity 
and economic development tended to prove more 
salient, reflecting both a relative lack of rural civic 
mobilization and the problematic legacy of colonial 
anti-famine land-use policies.
In promising macroeconomic and social welfare 
development, these regimes pursued technocratic 
policies that in some instances succeeded in averting 
famine. Ultimately, though, the authoritarian 
nature of the governments undermined their relief 
programs, leaving those most vulnerable unable 
to protect themselves. Thus, while systemic anti-
famine policies were implemented in colonial 
Africa, they were markedly simpler than their Indian 
counterparts.
Famine Prevention in Post-Colonial Africa
Perhaps the clearest example of a minimal 
commitment to famine relief is Sudan. A British 
iv  It was not unheard of for entire communities to be forcibly relocated in 
the name of preventing the spread of disease, though in reality these programs 
would have done little more than expose relocated populations to new disease 
vectors and undermine existing social institutions.
colony until 1956, the country descended into 
civil war almost immediately after gaining its 
independence. At this time, however, scholars note 
that the country exhibited structures that served to 
guard against localized food shortages degenerating 
into famine, but that their effectiveness was 
undermined by political instability. In 1969, Jaafar 
Nimeiri seized power and embraced political Islam, 
exacerbating the conflict between the country’s 
Northern (Muslim) and Southern (Christian) 
halves. Nimeiri’s corrupt regime destroyed its 
domestic accountability during this time, exploiting 
its strategic position in the West’s anti-communist 
strategy, and the state began to decay domestically.
In 1983, the specter of famine loomed in a 
few provinces, and, though drought struck again in 
1984, the government took no action. In an attempt 
to persuade international financiers of his country’s 
stability, Nimeiri stated publicly at that time that the 
situation in the South—civil war, by all accounts—
was “reassuring.”23 Though Nimeiri did ultimately 
acknowledge the gravity of the conditions, the famine 
helped solidify a coalition against him, resulting in a 
popular democratic uprising in 1985. However, the 
use was largely tactical, the consequence of which 
was that the movement failed to achieve any real 
political change.
Following the regime change, Sudan’s famine 
response effort was delegated to international relief 
agencies and became a depoliticized, technical issue. 
This shift was reflected in the creation of a technical 
early warning system that monitored economic, 
climatic, and agricultural data, in the spirit of the 
“neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating government 
responsibilities.”24 Under the democratically-elected 
Umma Party (1986-9), the country did possess liberal 
democratic institutions, but in practice they did not 
extend beyond Khartoum and other (Northern) 
urban centers. War in the South continued to 
rage, as did the famine. At this time, the press was 
unrestrained, though there was little interest in 
covering either situation.
Around this time, Ethiopia also failed to 
prevent famine, though the country’s prospects 
were not nearly so bright as Sudan’s after Nimeiri. 
Though Ethiopia was never colonized by a European 
power, Haile Selassie’s Solomonic empire came to 
an end in 1974 when he was deposed by a Soviet-
backed Marxist-Leninist military junta—the 
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Dergue (“council” in Ge’ez). Led by Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, the country immediately became a one-
party communist state. After the country’s 1973-4 
food crisis, the imperial government established 
a Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to 
help prevent future crises; following the revolution, 
the Commission quickly became a tool of the 
Dergue. Land reforms enacted around this time were 
designed by a small number of intellectuals without 
the involvement of the peasant base, and were 
imposed from above. The Dergue also established a 
central grain-marketing corporation that extracted 
food from rural populations to sustain a few cities 
and the ever-expanding army: “precisely the same 
pattern of distribution which prevailed before the 
revolution.”25 During the 1980s, the RRC became 
a political tool to implement radical social reforms, 
and later the military used it to relocate people. The 
RRC was also tasked with procuring foreign aid—
most of which went to fuel militias—and spreading 
propaganda, identifying the country’s 1983-5 famine 
as the result of overpopulation and drought, as 
opposed to war.
However, though drought and harvest failure 
did contribute to the famine, they cannot be 
considered direct causes. Even the government’s 
economic and agricultural policies were not as 
integral to the famine’s sustainment as the counter-
insurgency campaigns in Tigray and Wollo: “The 
zone of severe famine coincided with the war 
zone, and the phases of the developing famine 
corresponded with major military actions.”26 After 
the famine was uncovered by international media 
in the fall of 1984, the Dergue began to use “aid as 
a strategic alibi,” with a newly-formed UN Office 
for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia acting as an 
international official mouthpiece.27 On the other 
side of the frontline, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF) was much more cognizant of their 
reliance on the rural population, and as a result, 
aligned their interests. By “[linking] the political 
fortunes of the Tigrayan peasantry in the face of 
famine to the political fortunes of the TPLF,” the 
TPLF was also able to frame the government as 
having genocidal intentions.28
Ultimately, de Waal explains, Ethiopia’s famines 
of the 1970s and 1980s are “replete with ironies, 
which are explicable only by attention to the existence 
or not of an anti-famine political contract.”29 While 
the failed response to the 1973 famine was elitist and 
institutionalized (and resulted in the fall of Haile 
Selassie), the response to the 1983-85 famine was, for 
a short time, thought of as a major policy success for 
the government of Ethiopia. Because discourse about 
fighting famine is disconnected from discourse of 
internal conflict, though, the TPLF has largely been 
unable to take credit for its actions.
Parts of Mozambique also experienced famine 
due to domestic conflict. Even before Mozambique’s 
1975 independence from Portugal, the territory was 
subject to a decade of sporadic warfare. Additionally, 
following the formation of the new government—a 
one-party state based on Marxist principles—most of 
the country’s roughly 250,000 Portuguese returned 
to Europe, leaving the economy in shambles. Civil 
war broke out in 1977, and lasted until 1992. During 
times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile country 
that has little trouble feeding its population and 
producing exports. Between 1983 and 1984, though, 
the south-central region descended into famine, with 
most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll 
at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred 
in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, 
which was the result of conflict. The civil war was 
characterized by extensive human rights violations 
on both sides, and only ended after the accidental 
death of the president and the end of the Cold War.
Though political instability in Uganda arguably 
did not directly contribute to the country’s famine 
in 1980, the situation was indeed exacerbated by 
confusion and fragility following the fall of Idi Amin. 
After being deposed in 1979, Amin and his forces fled 
the country, and around the same time, crisis struck 
Karamoja, a region periodically afflicted by drought. 
Amin’s soldiers’ abandonment of a barracks within 
Karamoja further contributed to the instability, as 
traditional power relations were upset, and a power 
struggle following (possibly rigged) elections resulted 
in Karamoja—already a marginalized region—being 
caught in the crossfire. In the end, an estimated 
50,000 Karimojong perished. Though the human 
rights record of Milton Obote’s regime was below 
par, the country did manage to avoid famine in 
Karamoja following drought in 1984, just before a 
coup removed Obote from the presidency. Dodge 
and Alnwick (1986), though, attribute this success 
entirely to efforts by international aid organizations.
At the other end of the spectrum lies Botswana, 
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whose government is noted for exhibiting an inherent 
sense of obligation and a keen sense of its electoral 
interests. Having gained independence from Britain 
in 1964, Botswana has consistently maintained what 
Freedom House judges as free and fair elections. 
In reality, though, the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) has “benefited from an uneven playing field,” 
winning every contest since independence by a 
considerable margin.v,30 When drought struck in 
1982 (and continued for six years), the government 
enacted various programs in an attempt to prop up 
rural incomes. Though the country’s use of plow and 
tractor subsidies was socially regressive, the country 
did manage to avoid famine conditions. There are 
some, however, who argue that the country’s success 
was in no small part bolstered by its economic 
growth throughout the decade, rather than by 
any political commitment to relief. The country’s 
constitution does not contain explicit guarantees for 
freedom of the press, and though the government 
occasionally interferes in media affairs, abuse by the 
BDP is “neither as frequent nor as severe as other 
countries in the region.”31
Though Drèze and Sen similarly laud 
Zimbabwe’s government for enacting effective 
entitlement protection programs and preventing 
the country’s 1982-84 drought from precipitating 
a major famine, this is far from a complete picture. 
After gaining independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe 
and his ZANU party were elected to power. Less 
publicized than the country’s aversion to famine, 
however, was the ZANU military campaign 
conducted within the province of Matabeleland, 
home to supporters of the rival ZAPU party.vi This 
campaign—Gukurahundi—resulted in widespread 
famine conditions and the deaths of between 10,000 
and 20,000 people.vii Though this was obscured 
partly by Zimbabwe exploiting its strategic position 
between East and West, the Gukurahundi was also 
kept secret by restrictions on the content of news 
reports. It was not until 1987 that the campaign 
ended, following an agreement to unify ZANU 
and ZAPU (forming ZANU-PF). However, this 
relationship broke down some years later, and though 
the country has experienced “limited multi-party 
v  XRCOMP in Polity IV (see page 28).
vi  While ZANU was Western-aligned, ZAPU supported the USSR.
vii  Gukurahundi, meaning “the early rain which washes away the chaff 
before the spring rains,” in the Chi-Shona language, was also known as the 
Matabeleland Massacres.
democracy,” in practice, Mugabe has held power 
throughout.32
Last, but not least, Drèze and Sen consider the 
case of Kenya. After peacefully gaining independence 
from the British in 1963, Kenya became a republic, 
with Jomo Kenyatta as its president. Political pressure 
prompted Kenyatta to consolidate power in 1966 
after winning re-election, and established a de facto 
one-party state. Upon his death in 1978, then-Vice 
President Daniel arap Moi took his place, and though 
he enjoyed support from around the country, he was 
too weak to consolidate power. However, in 1982, 
some officers of the air force attempted and failed 
to overthrow him, and arap Moi dismissed political 
opposition, establishing a de jure one-party state. 
In 1984, the country experienced a severe drought, 
in response to which an ‘inter-ministry drought 
response coordinating committee’ was established 
and given top priority. Ultimately, the country 
managed to avert famine, though there is evidence of 
widespread hunger leading to malnutrition.
While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s 
responsiveness to political pressure from elected 
MPs, the (somewhat free) press, and the threat of 
political instability, de Waal argues that Kenya’s 
“success in escaping famine was largely attributable 
to the political astuteness of President Daniel arap 
Moi, who recognized a rudimentary and implicit 
political contract: feed the central highlands and 
(most importantly) the cities, and the government 
will survive.”33 However, despite recognizing this 
pressure, action taken by arap Moi’s regime seemed 
oriented primarily towards the placation of his 
opponents, failing to address the country’s more 
fundamental causes of poverty. Additionally, there 
are reports of numerous human rights violations 
during and after this time, as well as of governmental 
interference in press affairs that further complicate 
Drèze and Sen’s argument.34
To summarize, then: while Botswana and Kenya 
managed to avert famine conditions, neither were 
fully democratic. On the other hand, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Uganda were all autocratic, and 
all failed to avert famine conditions (in most cases 
due to war-time politics). Finally, on first glance, 
Zimbabwe also managed to avert famine, though in 
reality, the government indirectly created hunger to 
suppress political opposition.
However, while anecdotal evidence is largely 
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sufficient to reconcile Sen’s theory with reality, it 
cannot provide general (or generalizable) definitions 
of famine, competitive elections, or a free press—
all of which may be used to further examine the 
hypothesis’ validity. While for each variable, a simple 
binary measure (e.g., free press vs. restricted press) 
would seem to suffice, in reality, it is the gradations in 
between which provide information pertinent to this 
endeavor, as they often reflect decisions and actions 
of a wide political variety. 
Conceptualizing Famine
While most popular definitions of famine 
include scenes of malnutrition and starvation 
resulting from a general lack of food, this is 
somewhat of an oversimplification. Though famine 
conditions may obviously result in starvation and 
destitution, these symptoms are generally indicative 
of breakdowns of other social systems as well. Exactly 
which systems are affected and how they are affected, 
though, is a matter of debate. While some scholars 
argue that famine is the result of a decrease in relative 
exchange power of (vulnerable) populations, others 
emphasize nutrition, disease, social disruption, excess 
mortality, or other indicators as both reflecting and 
stemming from ‘famine conditions.’35 Clearly, then, 
we are faced with a complex phenomenon, with 
debates ranging from umbrella definitions to the 
relevance of component factors.
Early ‘modern’ scholars of famine were 
influenced by Thomas Malthus, who focused on 
the gap between food supply and demand given 
a level of technological advancement and a fixed 
amount of land. In his 1798 work An Essay on the 
Principle of Population as it Affects the Further 
Improvement of Society, Malthus identified famine 
as “a shortfall in the supply of food in a given 
area and, simultaneously, the death by starvation 
of a substantial proportion of the inhabitants.”36 
However, de Waal notes, the picture painted by this 
description—of society constantly existing on the 
verge of famine—is fallacious.
Though classical theories of famine have 
fallen out of favor, the question of whether famines 
stem from ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’ causes is still 
pertinent. Sen claims that the distinction can be 
misleading: famine, he argues, is fundamentally a 
social phenomenon, involving “the inability of large 
groups of people to establish command over food” 
in the face of adverse meteorological conditions.37 
Furthermore, though a natural catastrophe may 
cause (or exacerbate) food insecurity, a disaster’s 
impact will nonetheless depend upon how a 
society is organized. For example, a country with 
an extensive irrigation network could theoretically 
weather a drought much better than one without 
such redistributive infrastructure. That said, even the 
existence of droughts, floods, and other calamities is 
not independent of social and economic policies. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, problems of famine 
and hunger are often seen as related to climate 
change, overlooking the influence of societal factors 
on how people produce and consume food.
To those in power, the identification of famine 
as primarily resulting from drought or other 
natural causes can dramatically reframe lines of 
accountability, and may significantly alter the policy 
or international response. Even the identification of 
famine as such “represents a choice and is therefore 
more political than technical: rather than being 
‘found,’ a definition of 
famine must be ‘agreed 
[upon].’”38 Thus, when 
famine is blamed on 
natural causes, as with the 
Sahelian famines of the 
1970s—supposed products 
of cyclical “changes in heat 
coming from the sun”—
drought and famine (and 
the prevention or alleviation 
thereof) are removed 
from the scope of agentive 
action.39
Table 2: Estimated Mortality in Select Twentieth Century Famines 
Years Location (epicenter) Excess Mortality Causal Triggers 
1943 India (Bengal) 2.1m–3m Conflict 
1958-62 China 30m–33m Government 
1969-74 West Africa (Sahel) 101k Drought 
1972-75 Ethiopia (Wollo & Tigray) 200k–500k Drought 
1980-81 Uganda (Karamoja) 30k Conflict & Drought 
1982-85 Mozambique 100k Conflict & Drought 
1982-85 Zimbabwe (Matabeleland) 10k–20k Conflict 
1983-85 Ethiopia 590k–1m Conflict & Drought 
1984-85 Sudan (Darfur, Kordofan) 250k Drought 
1988 Sudan (South) 250k Drought 
  (Devereux, 2000) 
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 A similar argument that has existed since 
colonial times is the tendency to place blame on 
pastoral society, the idea being that these societies are 
‘backwards’ and conservative, and emphasize “stock 
accumulation as opposed to quality control, pastoral 
mobility and cattle raiding.”40 Indeed, it is not 
uncommon to see Africa’s endemic twentieth century 
famines attributed directly and solely to the victims 
themselves.viii
However, these arguments are misleading 
because they are based on generalities and present 
pastoralism as ignorance, without considering 
external factors such as the weather and often-
exploitative economic conditions. While Sen’s 
argument for considering entitlements follows, 
Okudi argues that such an approach is as “narrow 
in scope as it is limited to the immediate causes of 
famine and its consequences,”41 failing to expose the 




Beyond identifying the cause(s) of a famine, 
there is still the question of what ‘famine conditions’ 
entail, what distinguishes famine from mere ‘episodes 
of food insecurity’ or ‘chronic hunger,’ and, of 
course, how best to avert such afflictions. While 
‘pop’ conceptions of famine do tend to oversimplify 
matters, they can provide a helpful starting point for 
exploring what constitutes this complex occurrence.
To some, famine is identified primarily as a 
health crisis, manifested by significant changes in 
nutrition levels or starvation. In this vein, Drèze 
and Sen (1989) distinguish famine, “involving acute 
starvation and a sharp increase in mortality,” from 
chronic hunger, “sustained nutritional deprivation 
on a persistent basis,” as distinct yet related 
phenomena.42 While the former, they note, requires 
speed in intervention, often resulting in the use of 
existing distributional mechanisms, the nature of the 
latter is such that slower but more impactful policies 
may be enacted. This distinction is also important in 
considering the experiences of different countries. 
India, for example, experiences regular hunger 
and endemic undernutrition, though the Bengal 
viii  In the case of Uganda, for example, Akol (1985) argues that the 
development of agricultural productivity in affected areas was impeded 
by a ‘persistent’ rustling of livestock, leading to distress migration, as well 
as detrimental traditional rituals and practices. Similarly, Alnwick (1985) 
attributes the country’s 1980 famine to the ‘alarming’ amount of plundering 
and raids after the fall of Idi Amin the previous year.
famine of 1943 was the result of acute starvation 
escalating into large-scale mortality. On the other 
hand, countries may become adept at dealing with 
persistent hunger, but fall prey to considerable 
transient hunger, as in China during 1958-61.
However, de Waal (2000) argues that the 
distinction between transient ‘famine’ and ‘chronic 
hunger’ is fallacious; as with most social scientific 
terms, the linkage between real-world phenomena 
and social scientific concepts can be unclear. In 
response, de Waal (2000) identifies five main 
components of theoretical famine, with real-world 
instances combining some, if not all, to varying 
degrees: hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, 
mortality, and coping strategies undertaken in 
response. However, it is also possible, he notes, for 
a famine to occur without any number of these 
factors. Though uncommon, famine striking asset-
rich societies is not unheard of, while others have 
occurred without social breakdown or even excess 
mortality.ix
Rather than simply conceptualizing hunger 
and famine as occurring on the same linear scale, 
famines may assume qualitatively different forms 
as they escalate. While this does help clarify famine 
conceptually, it does not make the identification of 
such an occurrence any less imprecise.
Quantification
 A second measure for distinguishing famines 
from one another is severity—the degree to which 
each factor is present. One problem arises, however, 
in that it is often difficult to know the true scale of 
the excess mortality caused by a famine. Estimates 
are always approximate, and reflect the incentives 
of the published. For methodological reasons, then, 
demographers and nutritionists prefer to release 
‘crude mortality rates’ expressed in deaths per 
thousand, though the media and public tend to desire 
aggregate totals, which are not completely accurate 
measures.
De Waal identifies three qualitative degrees of 
famine severity: famines involving primarily hunger 
and impoverishment, those with elevated mortality 
rates, and those seeing spectacularly high death rates 
alongside severe social dislocation and collapse.43 
These measures also allow for consideration of 
ix  For example, though the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 was notable for 
occurring in a more developed and asset-rich country, it occurred during and 
was generated in no small part by the Nazi occupation.
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auxiliary factors such as changes in exchange 
entitlement mappings (e.g., the ability to buy food) or 
coping strategies.
De Waal then proposes five general types of 
famine, based on the sector of society most affected 
and the primary causal elements. The first, pastoral 
famines, primarily affect herders, and are caused by 
drought, leading to a lack of pasture and water for 
animals and an abandonment or reduction of the 
pastoral lifestyle. Due to their slow onset, they are 
quite dispersed and may be extremely protracted. 
Agrarian/smallholder famines affect scattered 
farming populations, and result from drought-
related production failures that often betray deeper 
social problems, such as exploitative economic 
relationships. These famines are usually slow-onset, 
and may manifest themselves as multiple localized 
famines surrounding an ‘epicenter’ from which 
waves of grain prices rise and cause migration. 
These famines may remain invisible outside the 
affected areas. Class-based/occupational famines 
negatively affect wage laborers and can result from 
rapid and drastic changes in exchange entitlements 
(e.g. collapse of labor, changes in grain price). 
These famines may become highly visible as people 
migrate, which in turn strains the resources of 
neighboring locales. Finally, wartime famines stem 
from conditions imposed on civilians during war, 
including destruction or confiscation of goods and 
restrictions on movement. These famines are highly 
dependent on the nature of the war.44
Of course, many famines are combinations 
of the above types. Agrarian famines, for example, 
are commonly associated with pastoral famines, 
and changes in grain prices caused by agrarian or 
wartime famines may cause class-based famines in 
adjacent areas. In Ethiopia in 1983-5, for example, 
“some of the highest mortality was recorded in areas 
which did not themselves suffer a major production 
failure, but which were suddenly (and to their 
residents, inexplicably) struck by high food prices 
and immigration of destitute laborers.”45
Generally, de Waal notes, ‘characteristic Asian 
famines’ have been class-based, rapid-onset, and 
high visibility, making coping strategies less helpful 
and state action more necessary. In contrast, African 
famines are generally more localized, slow-onset, 
and low in visibility, placing greater importance on 
coping strategies than public action. It is for this 
reason that famines in Africa often fail to achieve 
political significance.
Walker (1989), on the other hand, focuses on 
behavioral responses to food insecurity, with four 
distinct ‘stages’ of coping strategies. The first includes 
strategies for overcoming ‘normal seasonal stress.’ 
The second includes increasingly irreversible coping 
strategies as scarcity persists (e.g., selling livestock 
or mortgaging land). The third is “characterized 
by dependence on external support,”46 such as 
international aid, and if all else fails, the fourth stage, 
starvation and death, will follow.47 While the first 
stage is at least indicative of food insecurity, the 
second embodies a weakening of future security in 
the name of present survival.
Thus, both Walker and Howe remind us that 
“famines threaten livelihoods as well as lives, and 
that effective famine prevention requires early 
intervention to protect livelihoods, rather than 
mandating relief just to ‘save lives.’”48 Because coping 
strategies are highly context-dependent, though, 
their usefulness as generalizable famine indicators 
is diminished. Some authors distinguish ‘coping’ 
from ‘adaptive’ strategies, while some argue that 
such strategies may be adopted concurrently, while 
still others dismiss the idea of dividing famine into 
‘stages’ at all. Ultimately, then, theories promoting 
coping strategies as a viable dimension of classifying 
famine do not effectively justify their (exclusive) use.
Whereas coping strategies are context-specific, 
Howe and Devereux argue that nutrition-based 
indicators may be compared universally. However, 
this metric also possesses definitional problems, such 
as what specific rate of malnutrition or mortality 
indicates the beginning of a famine. Additionally, 
nutritional indicators generally refer to children 
under five years of age, though children over five 
and adults are demonstrated to be more affected 
by emergencies than are younger children, in part 
because adults will often reduce their intake to 
ensure that their children have enough food. Child 
malnutrition, then, may serve as a ‘trailing indicator,’ 
failing to manifest until well after adult malnutrition 
has set in.
A third complication of nutrition-related 
metrics is the ambiguous relationship between 
aggregate nutrition and food crises, as “malnutrition 
outcomes can be the result of [factors]... such as 
disease, an unsanitary public health environment or 
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poor child-care practices.”49 In particular, the point 
is raised that nutrition should not be considered an 
indication of famine independent of wider food-
security information, as low rates of malnutrition 
may obscure advancing famine conditions such as 
severe degradation of livelihoods or the use of drastic 
coping strategies.
To provide greater operational clarity and 
accountability for famine prevention efforts, Howe 
proposes a bipartite scale to estimating famine 
severity. In addition to the ‘magnitude’ of a famine, 
which refers to the aggregate impact, the authors 
establish ‘intensity’ as a separate metric, reflecting the 
severity of the crisis at a given time and place.
Intensity
To estimate a measure of ‘intensity,’ the 
authors combine anthropometric and mortality 
indicators, as well as ‘food-security descriptors.’ 
The “anthropometric/mortality indicators provide 
cut-offs for each level that can be compared across 
situations. The food-security descriptors capture the 
dynamic, self-reinforcing changes in the livelihood 
system associated with increasing degrees of food 
insecurity and famine, and can be adapted to specific 
circumstances (for example, drought or conflict) 
and diverse contexts.”50,x Additionally, the authors 
establish a system of weighting anthropometric/
mortality versus food-security indicators depending 
on which is estimated to occupy a more causal role.
One issue with this scale, however, which has 
yet to be resolved, is the appropriate unit of analysis 
for determining the intensity level. The authors 
offer no solution, except to note that the intensity 
(localized) and magnitude (aggregate) measures 
are designed to be complementary. By creating 
an ordinal scale of localized food insecurity, the 
situation may be observed over time, and allows 
external stakeholders to make more informed 
decisions regarding aid.
Magnitude
A complete assessment of a crisis’ full impact, 
Howe and Devereux argue, can only be made in 
retrospect. Thus, ‘magnitude’ refers to “the scale 
of human suffering caused by the entire crisis, as 
x  “The anthropometric/mortality indicators and food-security 
descriptors can be thought of as registering the effects of a crisis on the 
‘lives’ and ‘livelihoods,’ respectively, of the affected population.” (Howe and 
Devereux, 2004)
proxied by excess mortality.”51 The authors also note 
that mortality of the ‘magnitude’ scale starts at zero, 
rather than one because, as has been established, 
malnutrition need not imply deaths. As the authors 
clarify, this points to one resolution to the long-
standing debate as to whether famines must be 
characterized by excess mortality.
One the one hand, quantifying the impact of 
famine by excess mortality makes sense, because 
death is “the most tragic human consequence of 
famine.”52 Still acknowledging that ‘famine’ can 
occur without excess mortality enables a better 
characterization of famine as a complex set of 
processes (marked chiefly by hunger and destitution).
As mentioned earlier, the intensity and 
magnitude scales are designed to work in tandem, 
and thus interact in specific ways: “Any intensity 
level of 3 or above will register as a famine on the 
magnitude scale, even if it occurs in a very localized 
area, and even if no deaths are recorded (this could 
be a ‘Category A’ famine).”53 However, the opposite 
is not necessarily true: every incident which involves 
death is not necessarily a famine. Additionally, deaths 
can result from a food crisis condition, but the crisis 
may not be considered a ‘famine’ unless the intensity 
of the conditions in any given area matches or 
exceeds ‘level 3.’
Ultimately, Howe and Devereux argue that 
while their metric is not perfect, the establishment 
of a universal famine scale has great implications for 
accountability. During a crisis, such a scale offers 
a basis to pressure intervention by responsible, or 
accountable, actors, and after the fact, it may be 
invoked to assign ‘proportionate accountability.’ 
Proportionality, it is argued, is important to 
establishing accountability both in terms of the 
number of deaths caused, as well as intent
However, while attempting to determine intent 
can increase accountability and bring perpetrators 
to justice, the authors warn against the realization 
of perverse incentives, “such that governments and 
humanitarian agencies devote disproportionate 
resources and energy to ensuring simply that 
threshold malnutrition and mortality rates on the 
famine scales are not crossed.”54 Additionally, on 
the part of a perpetrator—if such a role exists—these 
perverse incentives may result in efforts to mitigate 
(or exacerbate) famine conditions to the extent that 
the crisis crosses one threshold or another. Instead, 
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the authors advocate formulating policy solutions 
that address the underlying causes of famine, though 
the effort to do so may be prompted or catalyzed by 
the identification of more discrete levels.
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
Democracy and Elections
While there certainly is no dearth of scholarship 
regarding identifying the presence, scope, and causes 
of famine, we turn now to the relationship between 
famine and politics. The events that catalyze famine 
may be of a natural or meteorological character; 
however, another line of thought identifies famine 
as resulting from a lack of action. The intuition 
for this perspective begins from the assumption 








CMR < 0.2/10k/day & 
Wasting < 2.5% 
Social system is cohesive; prices are 




CMR ≥ 0.2 by < 
0.5/10/day and/or 
Wasting ≥ 2.3 but < 
10% 
Social system remains cohesive; price 
instability, and seasonal shortage of key 
items; reversible ‘adoptive strategies’ are 
employed. 
2 Food crisis CMR ≥ .5 but < 
1/10k/day and/or 
Wasting ≥ 10 but < 
20% and/or prevalence 
of œdema 
Social system significantly stressed but 
remains largely cohesive; dramatic rise in 
price of food and other basic items; 
adaptive mechanisms start to fail; 
increase in irreversible coping strategies. 
3 Famine CMR ≥ 1 but < 
5/10k/day and/or 
Wasting ≥ 20% but < 
40% and/or prevalence 
of œdema 
Clear signs of social breakdowns appear; 
markets begin to close or collapse; 
coping strategies are exhausted and 
survival strategies are adopted; affected 
population identify food as the dominant 
problem in the onset of the crisis. 
4 Severe 
famine 
CMR ≥ 5 but < 
15/10k/day and/or 
Wasting ≥ 40% and/or 
prevalence of œdema 
Widespread social breakdown; markets 
are closed or inaccessible to affected 
population; survival strategies are 
widespread; affected population identify 
food as the dominant problem in the 
onset of the crisis. 
5 Extreme 
famine 
CMR ≥ 15/10k/day Complete social breakdown; widespread 
mortality; affected population identify 
food as the dominant problem in the 
onset of the crisis. 
CMR: crude mortality rate 
Wasting: proportion of child population (six months to five years) who are below eighty percent of the 
median weight-for-height or below –2 Z-score weight-for-height. (Howe, 2004) 
  
Table 4: Famine Magnitude Scale 
Category Phrase Designation Mortality Range 
A Minor famine 0–999 
B Moderate famine 1,000–9,999 
C Major famine 10,000–99,999 
D Great famine 100,000–999,999 
E Catastrophic famine 1,000,000 & over 
  (Howe, 2004) 
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that any society, with concerted effort, can prevent 
drought or other natural causes from escalating into 
famine. What circumstances, then, would alter a 
government’s response, or provoke a government to 
respond?
From Malthus (1798) comes a ‘demographic 
explanation’ of famine: it is the result of food supply 
restricting unsustainable increases in population. 
By this reasoning, famine is a natural phenomenon 
that cannot be averted. Though in retrospect we may 
call neglectful the government that allows famine 
to ‘run its course’ (e.g. Britain prior to 1880), the 
logic behind this argument only allows structural 
conditions to cause famine.
Sen (1981) gives an economic explanation of 
famine. He argues that famine is the result of the 
failure of some people’s entitlement relations to 
provide them access to enough food to survive. In 
other words, famines are allowed to occur when 
a government is insufficiently concerned with 
protecting the entitlements of its citizens (i.e., 
preventing a relative degradation or decline of 
people’s exchange entitlement mapping). A policy 
solution under this paradigm would take the form of 
entitlement protection, seeking to prevent changes in 
exchange conditions or in endowments.
Finally, Drèze and Sen (1989) and Sen (1999) 
offer reformulations of the entitlement argument, 
namely that competitive elections and freedom of the 
press are essential to preventing famine. The logic 
behind this argument is that competitive elections 
encourage politicians to appease voters and thereby 
protect their entitlements, while a free press acts as 
an additional tool for compelling governments to act.
De Waal (1990, 2000) responds to Sen, and 
though he believes in entitlement theory, he identifies 
entitlements as part of a larger picture. Famines are 
composed of five elements in varying proportions: 
hunger, impoverishment, social breakdown, 
mortality, and coping strategies in response to the 
first four. Thus, while famine prevention efforts 
should include entitlement protection measures, the 
presence and severity of each other factor should be 
considered as well.
Sutter (2011), on the other hand, explores 
‘statehood’ as a mediator between political 
institutions and famine. To disaggregate state quality, 
the author measures two forms of legitimacy: 
‘horizontal’—the ethnic fragmentation of a country—
and ‘vertical’—the “proximity of the state—as a 
structure of political power—to the society.”55 
According to this conception of political famine 
response, institutions that promote (vertical) 
accountability, such as a free press and competitive 
elections, are made distinct from the political will 
necessary to utilize those mechanisms effectively.xi
Another explanation, known as selectorate 
theory, comes from Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2002). They argue that governments possess a finite 
amount of response capacity: “both democracies and 
autocracies face a trade-off between the cost of action 
and the cost of inaction. The government is assumed 
to maximize its political support to stay in power.” As 
a result, famine mortality may occur if governments 
“find that inaction is the support-maximizing 
strategy.”56 Key to this decision is evaluating the size 
of the selectorate (S)—“the set of people who have 
an institutional say in choosing leaders”—relative 
to the winning coalition (W)—“the minimal set of 
people whose support the incumbent needs in order 
to remain in power.”57 When W is small, leaders 
may focus on the particularistic transfer of goods 
and services, at the expense of the provision of public 
goods, while a large winning coalition encourages 
bandwagoning.
In all cases, legitimacy accompanies political 
authority and trust, which forms the “basis of a 
better ability of institutions to protect citizens,” 
and increases the state’s power to act.58 A second 
aspect of legitimacy is the “respect of social contract, 
reflecting how close the state is to society,” and third, 
state legitimacy “decreases the risk of shocks leading 
to famine, especially the likelihood of civil wars: 
trust in institutions build peace.” While Mesquita 
et al. do not discuss the legitimacy of the state per 
se, the same responsiveness may be thought of as a 
successful broadening of the winning coalition—the 
set of people whose support the incumbent needs 
to remain in power. Sutter proposes a few measures 
of state legitimacy, including public opinion, a 
‘behavioral’ approach rooted in votes for and against 
the incumbent, and changes in politicians’ definitions 
of legitimacy.59 
Polity IV
xi  Her examination of thirty-six countries over 1980-2005 reveals two 
findings: as institutional quality improves, the likelihood of famine decreases; 
and even accounting for climatological and political shocks, a higher aggregate 
state legitimacy corresponds to a lower probability of famine.
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In an attempt to more rigorously examine 
each country’s political situation over time, I have 
included the use of the Polity IV dataset in my 
analysis. Begun as an attempt to “[code] the authority 
characteristics of states in the world system” the 
dataset’s level of analysis is a country’s ‘polity’: a 
“political or governmental organization; a society 
or institution with an organized government; state; 
body politic.”60 Among other reasons, the dataset is 
particularly useful for its placement of ‘democracy’ 
and ‘autocracy’ as collinear—captured as a country’s 
‘Polity Score’—as well as its disaggregation of 
‘executive recruitment.’
Table 5 contains Polity scores of relevant 
countries. For the scores of all African countries, 
see Appendix A. For each case, the score listed is 
the country’s average from 1980 to 1989, with the 
exceptions of Sudan, whose 1985 regime change 
warrants a distinction, and Uganda, whose score is 
only that under Obote II (1980-85).
The first score (POLITY) is simply the 
difference between a country’s democracy (DEMOC) 
and autocracy (AUTOC) scores on a scale of +10 
(full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy). Democracy 
is a complex measure comprised of three elements: 
institutions of accountability, constraints on executive 
power, and the guarantee of civil liberties. According 
to these elements, the authors identify a ‘mature and 
internally coherent democracy’ as “one in which 
(a) political participation is unrestricted, open, 
and fully competitive; (b) executive recruitment is 
elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are 
substantial.”61
On the other hand, though ‘autocracy’ has 
become a pejorative term in Western political 
discourse, the authors operationalize the concept not 
as simply a lack (or negative value) of democratic 
components. Rather, autocracies are polities with 
restricted political participation, executives chosen 
by political elites, and few constraints on executive 
power.
Though the authors construct a combined 
polity score (POLITY), they note that regimes may 
simultaneously exhibit elements of both autocratic 
and democratic authority. Rather, this variable is 
included as “a convenient avenue for examining 
general regime effects in analyses.”62 As with famine, 
though, scores near the middle of the spectrum are 
muddled somewhat, obscuring the combination of 
democratic and autocratic components. Thus, while 
POLITY is included in Table 5, this is mostly for 
the sake of readability. More detailed statistics are 
available in Appendix A.xii
As concerns this study are three statistics from 
the Polity dataset related to executive recruitment: 
“(1) the extent of institutionalization of executive 
transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of 
executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness 
of executive recruitment, XROPEN.”63
XRREG The regulation of executive 
recruitment refers to the extent to which a polity 
possesses institutionalized mechanisms for the 
transferal of executive power. This has three 
possible values: (1) Unregulated, (2) Designational/
Transitional, and (3) Regulated. ‘Unregulated’ 
implies “forceful seizures of power,” such as coups;xiii 
‘Designational/Transitional’ entails selection by 
political elites without formal competition;xiv and 
‘Regulated’ recruitment involves either hereditary 
succession or competitive elections.xv
XRCOMP The competitiveness of executive 
recruitment seems rather self-explanatory, with 
competition achieved when no contending party or 
candidate possesses a handicap (though incumbency 
xii  Also of note (in Appendix A) are periods during which countries’ 
scores are rated -77 or -88. Though Table 5 does not show these scores, they 
represent “standardized authority scores,” indicating years during which no 
assessed polity score could be awarded. A score of -77 represents a year of 
“interregnum,” or anarchy between successive regimes, and a score of -88 
notes periods of “transition.”
Of countries in Africa, only three were awarded a standardized 
authority score during the 1980s: Chad, Sudan, and Uganda. Briefly: After the 
death of Chad’s president in the late 1970s, central authority collapsed until 
1985, when a strongly autocratic government (with a POLITY score of -7) 
was established. In 1985, Sudan’s autocratic president, Jaafari Nimeiri (-7) was 
overthrown, and in 1986, the democratic Umma Party (7) was elected. For this 
transition the country was awarded -88 in 1985.
 Uganda during the 1980s experienced a similar but opposite shift. 
Following the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, Milton Obote reassumed power 
(having previously been deposed by Amin in 1971). Obote’s second term (3) 
was marred by widespread human rights abuses, and he was deposed in 1985, 
though his immediate successor only held power for six months. January 1986 
saw another new president, Yoweri Museveni (-7), whose administration was 
also marked by internal conflict and human rights abuses. He has held power 
since, though during that time the country has significantly improved its 
Polity scores.
xiii  Such transfers may be legitimized after the fact through (noncompetitive) 
elections or the enactment of legislation, though a polity will remain classified 
as unregulated until the coup leader has been replaced via “designative or 
competitive modes of executive selection.” (ibid.)
xiv  Also considered here are polities with arrangements made following an 
initial unregulated seizure of power that seek to regularize future transitions 
of power, as well as polities in transition from selective to elective modes or 
vice versa.
xv  The fundamental distinction between regulated and unregulated 
recruitment is the level of institutionalization, and, in competitive cases, 
impartiality.
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is obviously significant). This measure also has three 
possible values: (1) Selection, (2) Dual/Transitional, 
and (3) Election. ‘Selection’ refers to determination of 
executives by “hereditary succession, designation, or 
by a combination of both;”64,xvi ‘Dual/Transitional’ 
implies a polity with dual executives chosen by 
different means, or transitions between selection and 
election; and ‘Election,’ of course, refers to executive 
selection by competitive election between two or 
more parties.
XROPEN The ‘openness’ of executive 
recruitment is the extent to which all members of 
the politically active population have an opportunity, 
in principle, to attain the position of chief executive 
through an institutionalized process. If transfers 
of power are coded as Unregulated in XRREG, or 
involve a transition to/from Unregulated, XROPEN 
is coded 0. Four degrees of openness are used: (1) 
Closed, (2) Dual Executive–Designation, (3) Dual 
Executive–Election, and (4) Open.
For a translation of Polity IV executive 
recruitment concepts and component variables, as 
well as component variable scores for all African 
countries by year (1980-1989), see Appendix A.
Press
Though literature reviewed thus far has pointed 
to various political mechanisms of accountability that 
mediate the relationship between the government 
and its citizens, this is only half the picture.  Indeed, 
xvi  This also includes rigged or single-candidate elections, replacement of 
presidents before the end of their term, military selection of civilian executives, 
selection from within an institutionalized major party, incumbent selection of 
successors, boycotts of elections by major opposition parties, et cetera.
as much of the literature and multiple cases show, 
the presence of democratic institutions does not 
necessarily warrant their application towards the 
prevention of famine. Though institutionalized 
mechanisms of vertical or horizontal accountability 
may exist, the government may still possess a 
monopoly on the regulation of civilian activity, 
including the dissemination of 
information.
Thus, an equally important 
mechanism for generating government 
accountability is one that is in practice 
distinct from the government itself 
(bottom-up, so to speak). Just as a 
governmental separation of powers 
can promote a system of checks and 
balances, a free press can provide an 
important check on government action 
(or inaction). As Drèze and Sen note, 
it is important to remember that state 
action is by no means independent of 
“political ideology, public pressure, and 
popular protest.”65 However, as with governmental 
mechanisms of accountability, the efficacy of the 
press is by no means guaranteed.
Indeed, though a free press can help spread 
information within and between countries—in the 
latter case attempting to evoke embarrassment or 
shame—a free press may only help prevent famine 
if “those vulnerable to famine are considered fully 
citizens of the country.”66 It is not enough for the 
press to simply possess the freedom to report, but a 
‘political trigger’ must be present as well. To return 
to Mesquita et al. and selectorate theory: in serving 
to help fight famine, the press must make clear who 
exactly the winning coalition includes, both to the 
government and to the voters.
Devereux (2000) argues that a combination of 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ mobilization is essential 
to catalyzing positive action in pursuit of rights. 
While primary mobilization is undertaken in pursuit 
of one’s own interests (e.g., mass movements), 
secondary mobilization (a.k.a. activism) entails the 
participation of interest groups. Though primary 
mobilization is important, it cannot overcome famine 
alone, as those who mobilize could be satisfied 
with food handouts. Secondary mobilization, then, 
is necessary to identify issues and frame them 
politically. It is print, visual, and other forms of 
Table 5: Polity IV Scores of Examined Countries 
Country POLITY XRREG XRCOMP XROPEN 
Botswana 6.3 2 2 4 
Ethiopia -7.6 2 1 4 
Kenya -6.8 2 1 4 
Mozambique -7.6 2 1 4 
Sudan (Nimeiri) -7 2 1 4 
Sudan (Mahdi) 3.5 2.5 2.25 3 
Uganda (Obote II) 3 2 2 4 
Zimbabwe 3 2 2 4 
(Marshall et al., 2011) 
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broadcast media that must, in times of dearth, aid 
those affected in their fight against famine.xvii
To paint a more complete picture of each 
country’s civil and political freedoms, I have 
also considered Freedom House’s Freedom of the 
Press survey data. Unfortunately, though, in some 
instances there seem to be discrepancies between the 
numerical scores reported by Freedom House and 
more detailed historical accounts. Though in part 
this stems from an ironic lack of transparency on the 
part of Freedom House, it is also indicative of the 
complex, variable, and occasionally subjective nature 
of such a rating scheme.xviii These discrepancies 
are interesting in their own right, and when they do 
arise, I have attempted to reconcile them with my 
own findings.
Conducted by Freedom House since 1980, the 
Freedom of the Press survey measures the degree 
to which a country permits the free flow of news 
and information.xix To assess this, Freedom House 
undertakes a “multilayered process of analysis 
and evaluation by a team of regional experts and 
scholars” who examine legal, political, and economic 
indicators.67
From 1980 to 1988, Freedom House 
disaggregates countries’ scores into Print and 
Broadcast freedom (which I have combined to form 
half scores in Table 5), while from 1989 to 1992, they 
published consolidated statistics. For 1980-1988, 
xvii  Though the internet has largely upended the traditional media position 
as the sole means of distributing or broadcasting information, this principle 
applies equal well to so-called ‘new’ or ‘social’ media.
xviii  Though they do publish an outline of their methodology, for older cases 
especially the data is less extensive, and their conclusions less self-evident.
xix  According to the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
information freedom is a universal and basic human right. Article 19, 
specifically, states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media 
regardless of frontiers.”
then, I have provided averages, with Not Free equal 
to 0, Partially Free, 1, and Free, 2. For a table of 
Freedom House Press scores for all of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, see Appendix A.
Countries with half-scores include Botswana, 
Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Throughout 
the decade, Botswana fared the best of any country 
(among those examined), exhibiting a print freedom 
score of 2 and a broadcast score of 1. Kenya, Sudan, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, all had 
periods with print scores of 
1 and broadcast scores of 0 
(when both were not 0). No 
country on the continent 
exhibited more broadcast 
freedom than print freedom.xx
Theory
Since the publication of 
Poverty and Famines in 1981, 
Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze 
have argued that democracy—
minimally, a regime with a free press and competitive 
elections—prevents famine. To support the 
argument, Sen first considers India and China, 
noting that where one experienced a democratic 
revolution whose leaders successfully used famine 
to mobilize support, the other, in its pursuit of social 
and economic reforms, caused the greatest famine 
of the twentieth century without even realizing it.68 
This difference of outcomes Sen attributes to the 
formation of a political contract, predicated on the 
prevention of famine, between the revolutionary 
government and its supporters. This compact—
an explicit acknowledgement of a persistent and 
fundamentally important political issue—was also 
catalyzed by the country’s free press, which allowed 
the citizens to hold the government accountable, 
and was lent significant weight when independence 
followed its breach by the colonial government
In later texts, the argument is reformulated to 
fit countries in Africa. While the first, Botswana, 
supposedly maintained free and fair elections, in 
reality, a single party has won every contest handily. 
And though the second positive case, Zimbabwe, 
experienced political conflict and famine in 
Matabeleland, this was not exposed until after the 
end of the Cold War, in part due to restrictions on 
xx  For discussion of each, see Page 35.
Table 6: Freedom House Scores of Examined Countries 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983-4 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Botswana 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 2 
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0 
Uganda 1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 
Zimbabwe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0: Not Free; 1: Partly Free; 2: Free. (Freedom House, 2012) 
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the press. However, the country’s elections were, 
by most accounts, free and fair. Thus, while in 
Botswana the case could be made for the existence 
of an anti-famine political contract, it is imperfect. 
In Zimbabwe, the government may have been 
responsive to the needs of certain regions, though its 
actions in others indicate the lack of any significant 
anti-famine contract.
However, I argue that the history of Kenya 
is crucial to determining whether the causation is 
valid. As presented by Drèze and Sen, Kenya was a 
single-party state which, despite its lack of primary 
elections or political opposition, was responsive to 
the demands of the people due to elected members 
of parliament and a press which enjoyed limited 
but significant press freedoms. De Waal, though, 
diminishes the significance of the MPs and attributes 
government responsiveness to the astuteness of 
the President, who recognized the need for famine 
relief. However, in this case, the contract seems 
quite limited, painting a picture of the government 
response as mere political opportunism—though 
aid was distributed throughout affected areas (which 
were also politically significant), the government also 
committed various human rights violations during 
and after this time.69
Further, while Drèze and Sen consider the 
country’s limited but significant press freedoms to be 
causal in the formation of this political contract, the 
reality seems more complex. While Freedom House 
rates the country’s press as ‘Partly Free’ throughout 
the decade, Wanyande (1995) presents a more 
detailed analysis, describing the relationship between 
the state and mass media in independent Kenya 
as “uneasy and conflictual.” Just as the state “has 
continually accused the press of being unpatriotic 
and bent on serving the interest of Western nations 
at the expense of the interest of Kenya,” the media 
accuses the government of “undermining its freedom 
and right to inform and educate the public on matters 
of public importance.” Wanyande also notes that 
while each side’s perception of the other intensified 
following the advent of multi-party politics in the 
early 1990s, whereas “under one party rule, the 
state could, with relative ease, suppress attempts by 
the media to expose its shortcomings.”70 De Waal 
corroborates, noting that neither parliament nor the 
press had significant sway on the president’s decision 
to respond to calls for relief.
Though Kenya’s successful response to drought 
was prompted by a recognition of the people’s needs, 
it was not necessarily the result of any action by the 
press, and certainly was not motivated by the threat 
of being voted out of office—after 1982, arap Moi 
dismissed political opposition and established a de 
jure single-party state. While on the surface this 
seems to follow Sen’s causal theory, any argument for 
a political contract in Kenya under arap Moi would 
be dubious at best. For both Botswana and Kenya, 
then, famine prevention efforts and political stability 
were aided by their governments’ direct provision 
of goods and services, as opposed to any more 
programmatic efforts—reflecting a sizable disparity 
between the selectorate and the winning coalition.
In summary, while under certain circumstances 
famine may become an issue salient enough to 
warrant continual prevention efforts (i.e. the 
formation of an anti-famine contract), this is 
not always the case. Further, it seems that in a 
country’s mission to avert famine, a free press and 
competitive elections are neither sufficient nor 
necessary conditions to spur government action. 
Though such action may not, according to de Waal, 
constitute a strict ‘anti-famine political contract,’ 
the distinction between such a contract and its 
diminished analogs—a program or commitment—is 
far from clear, and, more importantly, of questionable 
relevance.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section includes specific details on the 
elections and press of each case, as well as their 
‘outcomes’ (e.g. whether they experienced famine 
or not). While I have attempted to include details 
regarding each case throughout the article where 
appropriate, this section includes consolidated 
summaries of each country’s relevant historical 
episodes.
Case Selection
For this project, I have chosen to consider 
all African countries that experienced a famine 
during the 1980s. This includes Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Uganda. Additionally, 
I have included Botswana and Kenya, both of which 
experienced drought and a reduction of marketed 
food, but managed to avert the onset of famine 
conditions.
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Though Drèze and Sen also consider the island 
nation of Cape Verde as a positive example of an anti-
famine political contract, I have not included this 
country in my analysis because it did not experience 
famine or the threat of food insecurity during the 
1980s. With that said, the country’s experience does 
accord with my reformulation of Sen’s theory.
Analytical Narratives
BOTSWANA 
Political Regime and Elections
Botswana, Zimbabwe’s neighbor to the west, was 
a British colony until 1964, when the UK accepted 
proposals for a democratic self-government. In 1965, 
the country ratified its constitution, and the next 
year, formally declared independence. The country 
has held regular elections since independence, which 
international observers have judged free and fair.
Though the country’s press has been rated 
“Free” by Freedom House since 1973, Botswana 
does exhibit specific authoritarian tendencies. 
Since independence, for example, the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) has won every single 
election by a considerable margin. Though the 
elections have been observed as free and fair, the BDP 
has “benefited from an uneven playing field, in which 
extreme resource and media disparities undermined 
the opposition’s ability to compete.”71,xxi
Institutions of Famine Prevention
Scholars note the country for having “the most 
enduring [anti-famine] system on the continent.”72 
Throughout the 1980s, though, the country’s harvests 
were insufficient to meet its needs.
Though Botswana’s electoral system—
characterized by high levels of professionalism and 
accountability—is undeniably important to the 
country’s improvement and self-preservation, it is 
arguably not the cause of the country’s ‘implicit anti-
famine political contract.’73 Instead, de Waal argues, 
this contract comes from “political commitment, a 
sense of administrative obligation, and accountability 
through participatory structures and electoral 
politics.”74, xxii
Botswana’s anti-famine system of the 1980s 
xxi  As a result, Levitsky and Way categorize Botswana as a “competitive 
authoritarian” state (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
xxii  Historically, the country’s ability to protect its food security has also 
been aided by its (relative) wealth, though at the same time, an absence of 
popular (i.e. secondary) mobilization for civil rights has helped to undermine 
government responsiveness.
was conceived primarily in response to its program 
employed in 1979-80, which was conventional 
and moderately successful. During this time, child 
malnutrition and mortality rates rose slightly, and 
much food aid was distributed poorly. In response, 
the government commissioned an independent 
evaluation that recommended the establishment of a 
famine prevention system modeled on India’s Scarcity 
Manuals. This solution, however, did not consider an 
important difference between the two countries: “in 
Botswana there was no mass popular agitation, but 
instead a government with a sense of obligation and a 
shrewd sense of where its electoral interests lay.”75
In the interest of bureaucratic integrity, 
the government commissioned, considered, and 
discussed publicly eleven more reports, and in 
January 1982, Botswana formally adopted a set 
of guidelines for a Drought Relief Programme 
(DRP). Modeled on Indian policy, the program was 
eventually reorganized and renamed the Department 
of Food Resources (DFR). Though the ‘right’ to 
relief was granted and not fought for (as it had 
been in India), the DFR was “an example of the 
characteristically Botswanan process of consultation 
and consensus-making, not of adversarial vigilance,” 
which helped ensure its continued success.76
After 1984, though (when Quett Masire was 
elected), the DRP shifted its focus from ‘human relief 
programs’ to agricultural programs, which were more 
expensive and economically regressive, and favored 
commercial and bureaucratic elites.
Press
The country’s constitution does not contain 
explicit guarantees of press freedom, though it does 
protect freedoms of speech, assembly, and expression, 
which are generally respected by the government. 
Freedom House consistently rated the country’s press 
as ‘Free’ during the 1980s.
Although the Botswana Democratic Party 
occasionally breached civil liberties by shutting down 
independent radio networks, placing pressure on 
private media by adjusting allocated state advertising 
funds, and occasionally prosecuted (or deported) 
critics under the 1986 National Security Act, “such 
abuse was neither as frequent nor as severe as other 
countries in the region.”77
Episodes of Food Scarcity
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Drought struck the country in 1982, and 
continued for six years. By 1984, relief-related 
expenditures had grown to 15 percent of total 
government expenditures, and around 20 percent 
of the rural working population was employed in a 
labor-based relief program. As a result, even though 
the drought was longer and more severe than that of 
1979, malnutrition rose only slightly before falling 
to levels lower than before the drought. No excess 
mortality was reported, and between 1980 and 1984, 
death rates among children and infants fell by over 30 
percent.
During this time, though, the DRP began 
to spend considerable amounts of money on an 
Accelerated Rainfed Arable Production Programme 
(ARAP). Designed as yet another relief program, in 
practice, it amounted to little more than a subsidy 
to rural elites. The program was also notable for 
having been designed in secret and announced over 
the radio, to the surprise of both civilians and the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
Begun as a one-year program, the Accelerated 
Rainfed Arable Production Programme was 
ultimately extended to four years and consumed 
over half of the Drought Relief Programme’s annual 
expenditures. Seventy-five percent of this was taken 
up by a 100 percent plowing subsidy to tractor 
owners—commercial contractors who plowed more 
land than was ever cultivated. The expansion of 
commercial tractor ownership proved to be socially 
regressive, as well: by awarding subsidies to the 
individual in whose name the land was registered, 
customary land tenure institutions (communal/
mutual ownership among many relatives) were 
destroyed, as were the equally complex customs 
regarding oxen ownership and lending. This led 
to greater income inequality, as well as increased 
plot sizes and agricultural output of larger farmers 
and a reduction or elimination of the agricultural 
productivity of smallholders. There was also a high 
misappropriation of funds, in contrast to most other 
Botswanan entitlement programs.
Once again, an independent evaluation was 
commissioned. Though the resulting report was 
highly critical of ARAP, its existence alone reflects an 
“enduring sense of government obligation for rural 
welfare.”78 The evaluation ultimately recommended 
the government’s delinking famine prevention from 
agricultural programs, and focusing on lasting 
solutions to the economic vulnerability of the 
poorest.
During this time, though the Drought Relief 
Programme’s shortcomings were overshadowed 
by the economic effects of the country’s diamond 
mining industy, Botswana’s GDP grew at 18 percent 
per year between 1985 and 1990, up from 3 percent 
per year earlier in the decade.
Ultimately, the strengths of the Drought 
Relief Programme lay not in any explicit anti-
famine contract, but in the “integrity of the public 
administration and the BDP’s astute use of patronage 
and local institutions to ensure popular legitimacy 
while still pursuing policies aimed at enhancing the 
power and wealth of a commercial-governmental 
elite.”79 Despite admirable levels of accountability, 
though, the program faced weakness in its inability 
to catalyze mass political mobilization for the 
enforcement of the government’s commitment to 
relief. Instead, the poor still relied on structures of 
representation in which they had little power to set 
the agenda, such as Village Development Councils 
and general elections.
While the Accelerated Rainfed Arable 
Production Programme exacerbated economic 
inequality, the Drought Relief Programme 
augmented state power with respect to the rural 
poor by recasting patronage networks as focused 
on state structures, rather than customary exchange 
networks. Thus, drought and famine relief in 
Botswana remained “hostage to a patrimonial style 
of government, albeit a relatively benevolent one.”80 
Though Botswana’s relief program is often invoked 
as a notable example of African anti-famine systems, 
it is important to remember that this ability was 
bolstered in no small part by the country’s economic 
growth.
ZIMBABWE
Political Regime and Elections
Prior to the country’s birth in 1980, Zimbabwe 
was engaged in a protracted war of independence, 
during which the Rhodesian counter-insurgency 
used food as a weapon. Their techniques involved 
the forcible relocation of rural populations and the 
restriction of rural food supplies, creating widespread 
hunger just before independence. The plight of the 
guerrilla struggle was, therefore, based in part on an 
intimate symbiotic relationship between the front 
25
accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s
and the people, paving the way for a strong political 
contract.
However, two complicating factors exist 
when analyzing the Zimbabwean case. First, the 
revolutionaries invoked traditional spirit mediums 
to gain legitimacy, and second, the front constantly 
inflated claims of popular mobilization.81 Even 
before independence, then, there were few significant 
channels for popular representation, with dissent 
subdued by party politics.
February 1980 saw the creation of a liberated 
Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) party winning 
the first election by a considerable margin. Polity 
reports this election as regulated, competitive, and 
open (ideal conditions). Elections were held again in 
March 1990, though independent observers reported 
this election as neither free nor fair.82
Institutions of Famine Prevention
As a leader, Mugabe was committed to 
several radical agendas, though in the end, a lack 
of executive ability betrayed him. Health and 
education services were improved almost as much 
as was promised before independence, and some 
structural inequalities of agricultural marketing 
were removed. Additionally, following drought in 
1980, the government introduced temporary taxes 
to finance future relief measures without resorting to 
foreign aid. This levy was relatively successful, and its 
funds were used for relief programs after the (milder) 
drought of 1987.
Compared to other African countries, 
Zimbabwe’s economy is vigorous and diversified, 
though some social and economic inequalities persist 
as colonial residues. Thus, the agricultural sector 
is starkly divided, with the majority of fertile land 
cultivated by a group of commercial farmers, while 
peasant production is largely limited to ‘communal 
areas.’ Even within these communal areas, there 
exists regional variation in both agricultural potential 
and access to infrastructural support, with further 
divisions between ethnic and class groups. As a 
result, despite the economy’s relative prosperity, large 
sections of the population do live in acute poverty
Although they receive almost no attention, 
Drèze and Sen highlight the direct entitlement 
protection programs undertaken by Zimbabwe as a 
significant factor in preventing the country’s 1982-84 
drought from precipitating a major famine. Though 
the country’s food supplies grew around this time, 
“a close examination of the facts reveals that the 
prevention of famine in 1982-4 must be attributed as 
much to far-reaching measures of public support in 
favor of affected populations as to the growth of food 
supplies.”83
Despite the government’s “socialist aims,” 
the country has maintained private ownership 
and market incentives, and since independence 
the country’s social services—particularly those 
related to health and nutrition—have experienced 
considerable improvement.84
Press
Prior to independence, restrictive laws 
consistently stifled the media. For instance, during 
the fight for independence, the government 
proscribed reports about casualties, and instructed 
the media only to report rebel casualties and their 
retreats to Zambia and Mozambique.85 As a result 
of this and other instances of restraints on the 
media, the fight for a free press became central to the 
struggle for independence.
However, after independence in 1980, Mugabe’s 
government did not follow through with its pre-
independence promises regarding media reforms. 
In fact, the only colonial act that was immediately 
repealed following independence was one that 
prohibited reporting on debates in parliament. In 
January 1981, though, the government established 
the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust to expedite the 
transition of media control from the white minority 
to all of Zimbabwean society. At this time, the 
Ministry of Information also imposed restrictions on 
the content of news reports, despite its emphasis on a 
free, non-partisan, and mass-oriented media.8
This restriction on reporting was one of the 
primary reasons Gukurahundi was met with such 
little international outcry. In addition to limiting 
the scope of information contained in reports, the 
government imposed curfews and denied press 
access to affected areas. A state of emergency was 
declared, which allowed the government to “detain 
and arrest ZAPU leaders, and deport international 
journalists for their reporting of human rights 
abuses.”87 On a systemic level, Zimbabwe was a 
‘Frontline State’ during the Cold War, which allowed 
Mugabe to couch Gukurahundi as a campaign to 
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quash Communist-allied ZAPU dissidents. At the 
same time, Drèze and Sen argue that the press was 
“relatively unconstrained,” and that they played a 
great part in keeping the government focused on the 
drought.88
In the face of government pressure, though, the 
media did succeed in making advances in its ability 
to criticize the government. Later in the 1980s, one 
newspaper published an article about the country’s 
AIDS problem, the government was criticized for 
being a one-party state, and a widespread corruption 
scandal was exposed.
Episodes of Food Scarcity
Soon after independence, the country began 
to experience a drought. This lasted three years, 
and peaked during the second year (1983). Though 
Zimbabwe generally produces a grain surplus, in 
the worst affected areas of the country, harvests 
of Zimbabwe’s principal staple, maize, completely 
failed during the drought. To combat this, Zimbabwe 
imported food in an attempt to reduce variability 
in the food supply. Botswana, in contrast, was less 
predisposed to 
produce a surplus, 
and consequently 
resorted to 
propping up rural 
incomes during 
the same drought 
period. Zimbabwe’s 
strategy worked 
well in most areas, 
with local party 
chairmen doling 
out relief to those 
earning less than 
the legal minimum wage.
Following two consecutive years of 
massive reductions in maize sales to the Grain 
Marketing Board (see Table 6), remittances from 
relatives became a crucial line of support for 
many households, and, as in Kenya, many of the 
households whose members resorted to wage labor 
in the wider economy were found to be the least 
susceptible to the drought. For others, though, 
government relief became the main or even the only 
source of food.
Begun in 1982, the country’s famine 
prevention measures were taken early and given 
high political and financial priority. The main 
entitlement protection measures included large-
scale food distribution to the adult population and 
supplementary rations for children under five. 
Weiner (1988) estimates the number of people for 
whom the government drought relief program 
supplied the primary means of survival during 
1982-4 at about 2.5 million—roughly 30 percent 
of the population. However, that said, estimates 
of how many households actually benefitted from 
government food distribution are complex and 
varied.89 Despite variation in estimates of the 
number of beneficiaries, though, the program is to 
be commended for its size and logistical complexity, 
though there were reports of delays, uncertainties, 
and frauds in the distribution of food.
The programmatic distribution of food faced 
its own difficulties, with some accounts describing 
the eligible population as limited only to households 
without any member in regular employment. There 
have also been disputes over how judicious the 
distribution actually was; though some suggest the 
distribution was fair, others argue that the pattern 
was indiscriminate and blind to people’s actual needs. 
Such variation may have stemmed in part from the 
politicization of the program, given that at times 
party members became involved in the provision 
of relief, leading to favoritism along party lines. 
Additionally, the distribution of food was limited to 
rural areas, an unusual focus for relief programs that 
tend to have an urban bias.
Matabeleland
While these successes were well publicized, 
Table 7: Zimbabwe: Official Maize Sales, 1979–85 
 Percentage sales by type of farmer 
Season Total Sales (tons) Δ% Large-scale commercial Communal lands 
1979-80 825,563 n.a. 87.9% 8.1% 
1980-81 2,013,759 +143% 82% 14.4% 
1981-82 1,451,827 –27% 70.4% 21.8% 
1982-83 639,747 –55% 72.6% 21.4% 
1983-84 941,591 +47% 58.6% 35.5% 
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the conflict and famine in Matabeleland managed 
to avoid popular consciousness. Following 
inflammatory remarks by a high-ranking ZANU 
official, the region, home to many ZAPU supporters, 
was brutally suppressed by the government. This 
suppression came to be known as Gukurahundi.xxiii 
Also known as the Matabeleland Massacres, 
the campaign lasted from 1982 to 1985, with an 
estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Matabele murdered and 
tens of thousands more tortured in internment camps 
by Mugabe’s infamous North Korean-trained Fifth 
Brigade.90
On the other hand, Drèze and Sen describe this 
conflict as a product of the program’s politicization, 
noting that “the coverage of the drought relief 
programme in Matabeleland, the stronghold 
of political dissidents, has been described as 
‘exceedingly patchy.’”91 Leys (1986) adds that the 
government blamed the dissidents for disrupting 
relief efforts, even holding them responsible for the 
drought at one point. These accounts, however, seem 
more concerned with the ‘official’ provision of aid 
and the mechanisms thereof, rather than considering 
the situation as a whole.
The year 1984 also saw the third consecutive 
harvest failure, causing drought relief to become a 
major source of food for people in Matabeleland. 
In addition to killing civilians outright, the Fifth 
Brigade exploited Matabeleland’s food dependence, 
with later reports noting the use of “food as a weapon 
of coercion.”92 Curfews and blockades were set up 
across the region, and soldiers began to control or 
block all food supply channels. When relief was 
distributed, “recipients were not allowed to take 
any rations away, but had to eat their meals under 
army supervision,” amounting to “a sentence of 
starvation.”93 Only after a unity agreement between 
ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 that merged their parties 
did the conflict come to an end, though this was 
at the expense of competitive politics. Though the 
Matabeleland famine has not been systematically 
investigated, there is strong evidence pointing to its 
place as the result of a power struggle between the 
two parties.94
Despite this, Sen argues that the overall 
effectiveness of the country’s entitlement protection 
programs at this time is “beyond question,” with 
starvation deaths having been “largely and perhaps 
xxiii  “The early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains,” in 
the Chi-Shona language.
even entirely prevented.”95 Bratton (1987) boldly 
argues that “no person in Zimbabwe died as a direct 
result of starvation,” though most are not quite so 
confident.
Beyond this, the government’s health and 
education efforts since independence have caused 
“a noticeable improvement in the health status of 
the population of rural Zimbabwe in spite of the 
severe drought,” most notably manifesting as an 
apparent decline in infant mortality throughout the 
drought period.96 A decline in child morbidity (in 
relation to immunizable diseases, at least) was also 
reported around this time, caused primarily by the 
government’s widespread immunization campaigns
Overall, evidence regarding the nutritional 
status of the population during the drought is 
mixed. Many informal reports stressed rising 
levels of undernutrition in the early stages of the 
drought, although there is some evidence that this 
statistic declined following an expansion of the 
relief program in 1983. Nonetheless, over the whole 
drought period, there is a lack of any marked change 
in the nutritional status of the total Zimbabwean 
population, a remarkable accomplishment given the 
initial severity of the drought.
KENYA
Political Regime and Elections
A British colony until 1964, Kenya gained its 
independence through peaceful elections. Following 
the 1978 death of the country’s first president, Jomo 
Kenyatta, Vice President Daniel arap Moi assumed 
power and was met with support throughout the 
country. Though he followed in the footsteps of his 
popular predecessor, Moi was too weak to consolidate 
power until 1982, following a failed coup by Air 
Force officers. Political opposition was dismissed, 
and the constitution was altered to establish a de jure 
single-party state. However, Drèze and Sen note that 
the country retained an elected parliament, arguably 
allowing for some degree of responsiveness.
Institutions of Famine Prevention
Kenya has experienced remarkable economic 
growth and stability since independence. The 
economy features a strong private sector and 
a substantial public sector based on parastatal 
corporations. However, the country has limited 
natural resources and no petroleum production. 
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Approximately 80 percent of the population lives 
in rural areas, mostly on the 20 percent of land that 
receives enough rainfall to support agriculture. Trade 
of food grain is managed by the National Cereals 
and Produce Board (NCPB), a government-owned 
corporation that sets prices by buying and reselling 
grain (mostly maize).
Press
At the time of independence, Kenya’s media 
was mostly foreign-owned but friendly to the new 
state. Kenyatta’s administration generally had a policy 
of nonintervention, and Kenyatta himself argued 
that the media should be free but responsible, with 
the administration having “frequently made calls 
to newsrooms, ostensibly to have some sensitive 
stories killed.”97 However, after 1978, when arap Moi 
assumed power, the press became subject to near-
constant attacks by the government, including the 
arrest and detention of some journalists and editors.
Episodes of Food Scarcity
Early in 1984, the country experienced a 
hundred-year drought that cut production of maize 
by half. Wheat and potato harvests were down 70 
percent, and pastoralists reported similar rates of 
livestock mortality. However, disaster never struck, 
thanks to the government’s entitlement protection 
efforts.
Kenya generally experiences two rainy seasons 
per year (once in spring and once in winter). As a 
result, the onset of drought in April 1984, continuous 
sunshine during the normal ‘long rain’ season, was 
evident without any technical early warning system. 
Around this time, the government launched an 
active response to the drought, beginning with the 
importation of food. The government’s ability to 
respond in this way was greatly aided by high market 
prices of coffee and tea, the country’s largest exports.
At the onset of the drought, the National 
Cereals and Produce Board possessed a stock that 
could last only four to six months. At the behest of 
the President, an ‘inter-ministry drought response 
coordinating committee’ that was tasked with 
assessment and response was established. They 
initiated commercial imports of food, negotiated with 
international donors for assistance, and established a 
task force to manage imports and distribution.
This effort was aided greatly by the government’s 
strong analytical capabilities, as well as an emphasis 
placed on ability rather than bureaucratic formality: 
“Junior clerks who operated microprocessors found 
themselves with immediate access to the Director 
of Planning,” resulting in unprecedented levels of 
productivity.98
Early on, the government chose to frame the 
drought as a serious problem, though “it would not 
be considered a crisis.”99 Normal administrative 
systems would be employed, with additional labor 
sourced from the private sector as needed; the 
response would be handled by Kenyans alone.
The low profile adopted by the government 
helped keep public concern in check, and the country 
managed to avoid hoarding and public security issues 
typically associated with crisis droughts. The use of 
normal administrative systems also helped keep costs 
low. Most importantly, however, their use “provided a 
conceptual frame of reference within which everyone 
could work. There would be no crises-motivated ad 
hoc programs.”100
However, despite the best efforts of the National 
Cereals and Produce Board, the inevitability of food 
imports soon became clear. Once the international 
community learned of the country’s need for food, 
the response was “dramatic. The government found 
itself in the peculiar position of welcoming aid while 
discouraging the general public and the donors from 
characterizing the situation as a crisis.”101 Arap Moi’s 
uncompromising stance on Communism may have 
influenced the international community’s response as 
well.
To determine how much food would be 
needed and when it would be needed required 
an estimation of aggregate need. The Ministry of 
Finance and Planning approached this problem from 
two perspectives: The first focused on aggregate 
nutritional requirements, while the second focused 
on national production shortfall as a proxy for 
imports needed. Ultimately, the second approached 
was used, “because its relative simplicity facilitated 
operationalization, and because it would reproduce 
market conditions experienced in a normal year.”102 
In the end, more than 850,000 metric tons of grain 
were imported.
Developing a schedule for the imports, 
however, proved to be particularly difficult. From 
negotiations with donors and initial assessments 
of the NCPB’s stocks, it became clear that even 
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with the most efficient effort of all parties involved, 
foreign assistance could not arrive until well after 
the depletion of domestic stocks. It also became 
evident that almost all aid would arrive in the form 
of food, rather than money, forcing Kenya to import 
grain commercially to endure the span between the 
exhaustion of domestic stocks and the arrival of aid
Another important question was the variety 
of maize to import. As Glantz (1987) notes, “[a]
lthough there is little nutritional difference, Kenyans 
strongly prefer to eat white maize as opposed to the 
yellow varieties.” Unfortunately, Kenyans are unique 
in this preference, and there is very little white maize 
grown for human consumption outside East Africa, 
such that the variety cost about 30 percent more. 
Ultimately, the decision was made to import cheaper 
yellow maize, as “it was felt that this premium for 
aesthetic preferences could not be justified.”103
Beyond saving money, importing ‘inferior’ 
yellow maize had a secondary effect of encouraging 
informal rationing by those who could afford 
alternative food supplies. Some scholars note that this 
ultimately contributed to a progressive distribution 
of grain. Because the yellow maize was less desirable 
than its white counterpart, the demand could be 
expected to drop substantially as soon as the rains 
resumed and white maize became available again. 
However, this meant that the government had to be 
careful not to import too much, as it could end up 
with stocks of valuable but unmarketable grain.
To further emphasize that the drought was a 
‘serious problem’ rather than a crisis, the government 
chose to distribute food primarily via established 
commercial channels in an attempt to reduce 
variability in food prices and availability. This would 
help decrease the likelihood of any informal food 
economies, as well as maintain an air of stability and 
confidence. Keeping food prices at normal levels, 
however, required a substantial subsidy of grain and 
its transport.
Thus, entitlement protection efforts took two 
forms. First, the imported food was directed to help 
reduce variability in the food supply, and second, 
direct relief was provided to the neediest households.
Initially, the government attempted to 
accomplish the former through employment 
generation, developing a food-for-work system, 
though that scheme was eventually phased out in 
favor of rural development projects with cash wages 
(which had been successful in India). Additionally, 
early in the drought response, the government 
realized that despite its employment generation 
efforts, some households would need direct relief. 
As a result, District Commissioners were authorized 
to freely distribute food wherever it was needed, 
mainly through local chiefs who knew the needs of 
their community. By most accounts, the chiefs did an 
effective and equitable job, though in the end, most 
households receiving rations were given very little 
food (just some 5 to 10 percent of individual daily 
requirements).
A number of NGOs also became involved in 
the response effort, with some groups establishing 
their own import schemes. To ease this process, 
the government allowed organizations to draw 
grain from existing stocks, which would later be 
replenished by the NCPB. While most NGOs 
focused on food-for-work programs, some also 
provided seeds for future harvests. Though deserving 
of commendation, NGOs’ efforts proved almost 
impossible to coordinate—because these programs 
were established before the drought and were 
expected to continue afterwards, there was great 
reluctance to surrender autonomy for the sake of 
the larger coordination effort. As a result, people 
and organizations struggled to obtain adequate 
information for planning and management during 
the drought.104 To combat this, the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning moved quickly to assemble 
pertinent information and began disseminating 
weekly reports on the drought response effort.
While Drèze and Sen attribute the government’s 
responsiveness to the actions of elected members 
of parliament, de Waal argues that the country’s 
ultimate “success in escaping famine was largely 
attributable to the political astuteness of President 
Daniel arap Moi, who recognized a rudimentary 
and implicit political contract: feed the central 
highlands and (most importantly) the cities, and the 
government will survive.”105 However, despite the 
successes of arap Moi’s regime in averting famine 
during this time, action taken ultimately amounted to 
little more than securing their own base of power and 
represented only a slight policy change from colonial 
times. Thus, though hunger was averted, the Kenyan 
government “avoided tackling the structural causes of 
poverty and vulnerability in both the highlands and 
the lowlands.”106
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Ultimately, Glantz argues, the success of 
Kenya’s drought response effort was a product both 
of official institutional action and cooperation by 
laborers in the name of national unity and pride. 
Cohen and Lewis (1987) stress the role ‘political 
commitment’ played in the government’s response, 
while Drèze and Sen emphasize the threat of political 
instability following the government’s failure to avert 
famine after the drought in 1979.107 The instability 
argument, however, seems especially appropriate, 
as the affected Central and Eastern Provinces were 
both politically important and meteorologically 
and economically unstable, and also because 
drought conditions reached the outskirts of Nairobi. 
Regardless, the Kenyan case provides insights that 
challenge and improve conventional prescriptions for 
responding to food insecurity.
Implications for Famine Response Efforts
 Most prescriptions for famine response 
efforts are based on analyses of the worst famines 
during which, by definition, existing structures 
and systems are unable to cope with the demands 
placed upon them. Conventional wisdom dictates 
the creation of institutional structures designed 
specifically to respond to food shortages. Focusing on 
these types of responses, though, tends to overlook 
the effective action a government can undertake 
independent of purpose-specific institutions. By 
virtue of their non-crisis nature, the rare cases when 
government is successful in averting famine often go 
unrecognized, their significance unappreciated. Their 
importance, however, “lies in the fact that potential 
famines are prevented from growing to the point of 
attracting international attention.”108
 The Kenyan case, on the other hand, 
suggests that there may be two major approaches to 
addressing food insecurity: the “permanent structural 
strategy typically recommended by the international 
community,” and a “functional standby strategy.”109 
Without establishing any purpose-specific structural 
apparatus, Kenya’s government was able to draw 
upon the managerial and operational resources of 
existing administrative structures. While the country 
did undertake some steps deemed essential for food 
security, these were not integral to the creation of a 
crisis-response capacity. Rather, strategies that helped 
mitigate drought and famine conditions were part of 
a broader national development strategy, with their 
success reinforcing this as a viable linkage.
UGANDA 
Political Regime and Elections
Uganda gained independence from Britain in 
1962, with the country’s first elections held the year 
prior. Though initially a republic, many debates 
occurred within the country over how centralized 
the government should be, with deep divides along 
national, religious, and ethnic lines. In 1966, Prime 
Minister Milton Obote suspended the constitution, 
and in 1967, a new one was ratified that expanded 
the president’s authority and abolished the division of 
traditional kingdoms.
In 1971, Obote was deposed by a military coup 
led by Idi Amin, who declared himself president, 
dissolved the parliament, and amended the 
constitution to give himself absolute power. Under 
Amin’s rule, the country experienced significant 
economic decline, social degeneration, and 
widespread human rights violations, resulting in the 
deaths of between one and five hundred thousand 
Ugandans. Following a border altercation with 
Tanzania, the Tanzanian army, with Ugandan exiles, 
fought for the liberation of Uganda, and in 1979, 
Amin and his armies fled to Libya.
In December 1980, the country’s first elections 
in eighteen years were held, which resulted in Milton 
Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress party 
returning to power. Though the Commonwealth 
Observer Group (a collection of groups formed to 
monitor elections throughout the Commonwealth 
of Nations) declared itself satisfied with the outcome 
of this election, there is considerable debate as to 
whether they were rigged.
Polity lists the country’s elections as having 
‘Transitional or Restricted Elections,’ one category 
below competitive elections. The country has some of 
the highest scores on the continent at this time.
Following a military campaign against the 
Uganda National Liberation Army—comprised of 
exiled Ugandans against Amin (as well as Obote)—
Obote was deposed in 1985, by military coup. 
Amnesty International estimates the Obote II regime 
as responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 
civilians across the country.
Institutions of Famine Prevention
In July 1978, when crop failures signaled a 
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dearth of food, Amin’s government took no action. In 
1980, the situation escalated, and eventually gained 
international attention following appeals by elders 
and an exposé in London’s Observer newspaper. 
However, by the time relief supplies began to arrive 
in June 1980, a large number of people had already 
died, and the situation was quite severe. In summary, 
during the 1979-80 food crisis, the government did 
not take action to avert famine conditions.
Press
Though the state and local press were silent 
on the 1980 famine until its exposure by Western 
media, the government had been alerted about 
the situation from 1978 onwards by way of food 
monitoring in Karamoja, crop acreage and harvest 
assessments by agricultural officers, and estimates 
of affected populations. By October 1978, there was 
correspondence at various levels of government 
regarding the food situation in Karamoja. Between 
September and October 1978, the District 
Agricultural Officers for South, Central, and 
North Karamoja had sent reports to the Provincial 
Commissioner for Agriculture, which described the 
loss of crops to disease and drought, as well as cases 
of starvation and migration by pastoralists.
However, almost all indications of the drought 
and impending famine occurred under the reign 
of Idi Amin. Shortly after assuming power in 1978, 
Amin “tortured and killed journalists... [and] shut 
down all newspapers except the one he used as his 
own propaganda vehicle.”110 Though Obote was 
perhaps only slightly less dictatorial than Amin, he 
did allow some independent newspapers to exist, 
“but their editors and journalists suffered constant 
harassment and prolonged imprisonment.”111
Episodes of Food Scarcity
Since pre-colonial times, the Karamoja region 
of Uganda has been plagued by drought and famine. 
Since the 1970s, though, natural, social, and political 
events have left the area “disaster-prone,” with 
the majority of the population impoverished and 
extremely vulnerable to food shortages.
During the 1980 famine, between 20,000 and 
50,000 people were believed to have perished.112 
Though the famine was centered in the Karamoja 
region, it also affected a number of other districts 
whose economies were agro-pastoral and 
agricultural. But though these areas experienced 
extreme food shortages between February and July 
1980, the intensity of the shortage and the disparity 
between the majority impoverishment and minority 
enrichment were both most notable in Karamoja.
Immediate causal factors included shocks to the 
rural economy in 1979 and 1980, including unusually 
low rainfall in 1979 and the war that ousted Idi 
Amin, both of which led to low agricultural 
production. The country’s inflation led to the sale of 
agricultural produce to meet peasant demands, but 
these stocks were bought primarily by speculative 
traders, who later resold them at prices unattainable 
by the poor. This led to further impoverishment 
as many households “resorted to sale of what they 
never would have considered objects of commercial 
transactions in normal times, i.e., land, cows, etc.”113
Episodic shocks also occurred in the early 
months of 1980, with neighboring districts receiving 
unusually heavy rains that washed away most planted 
crops. The rampant theft of cassava from the fields 
also exacerbated normal seasonal hunger, and was 
largely attributed to people displaced from Karamoja.
Within Karamoja, drought and raids were 
prevalent. 1978 and 1979 were years of minimal 
harvest, due to natural conditions as well as political 
instability. After the war of liberation, Idi Amin’s 
soldiers abandoned a stocked barracks in Moroto, a 
district within Karamoja. The guns were picked up 
and traded by locals, for many of whom this marked 
a considerable advance in defense technology.
This in turn led to increased violence among 
tribes, primarily in the form of raids. Conditions 
worsened, and many lost their herds. By the fall of 
1979, food was scarce, leaving to elevated starvation 
and mortality rates. The situation deteriorated further 
in early 1980, with the arrival of cholera from Sudan 
and restrictions on road travel in and out of the 
Karamoja.
Because the Karimojong people face a harsh 
environment and limited technology, pastoralism 
forms the basis of their society, with livestock herds 
comprising their principal source of food. Thus, 
Karimojong cows are rarely slaughtered, with food 
instead coming from animal products like milk 
supplemented by crops like sorghum and millet. 
The irregular rainfall of the area makes rain-fed 
agriculture unreliable, and it is not uncommon for 
seeds to be sowed up to four times per season. In 
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addition, the low level of productive development 
means that even after good harvests, “what is 
produced is consumed before the beginning of a 
new season.”114 The pastoralist Karimojong are, 
therefore, extremely vulnerable to environmental 
irregularities, raids, or epidemics.
To avoid the loss of animals and alleviate 
suffering during times of disaster, traditional 
measures such as “avoiding environmental 
degradation, close community solidarity through the 
exchange of gifts and ceremonies, keeping part of 
one’s herds with relatives or friends, raids approved 
by elders and assistance to those who are victims 
of a crisis” are employed.115 However, during the 
1980 famine, these traditional means of assistance 
collapsed across the region.
Overall, three factors were significant during 
the 1980 famine: livestock, security, and the limited 
role of rain-fed agriculture in the local economy. 
Areas that were hit hardest were also those with little 
livestock, due to raids, whereas those hit least were 
those with military superiority and animals.
In the end, the 1980 famine in Karamoja 
seems to have ended not through any concerted 
government action, but simply with the passage 
of time. Since then, the region has continued to 
experience recurring food shortages, including 
following drought in 1984. However, during this 
time, the country’s relative political stability allowed 
for a more effective response. Dodge and Alnwick 
note that the response of the UN, UNICEF, and other 
international relief agencies helped keep starvation 
deaths to a minimum, though “drought, armed 
conflict and the displacement of large numbers of 
people” still occurred.116
MOZAMBIQUE 
Political Regime and Elections
Prior to its independence, Mozambique was 
managed by Portugal. Ten years of sporadic warfare 
and a leftist military coup in Portugal in 1974 allowed 
the Marxist-Leninist Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) to take control of the 
territory. Within a year of Portugal’s Carnation 
Revolution, almost the entire Portuguese population 
had left Mozambique, and in June 1975, the country 
formally declared independence. The rapid exodus 
left the country’s economy in shambles. Soon after, 
civil war broke out against the western-aligned 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), 
lasting from 1977 to 1992.
From the time of independence to the 
resolution of the country’s civil war, FRELIMO 
was the only legal political party; the country’s first 
elections were not held until 1994.117
Institutions of Famine Prevention
Though droughts and famines have occurred 
throughout Mozambique’s history, in the past, people 
were generally able to carry out various coping 
strategies. Prior to colonial rule, people grew and ate 
drought-resistant crops such as millet, sorghum, and 
cassava. The arrival of European colonizers heralded 
the introduction of maize to the region, which soon 
became the national staple. However, maize is much 
more dependent upon rainfall, portending an era of 
precarious food security for the area.
In addition, the Portuguese forced African 
men to “grow industrial crops like cotton, and 
also forced them to provide labor in the mines of 
South Africa.”118 Beyond further exacerbating the 
area’s food security, this placed additional burdens 
on women to grow food crops in addition to their 
preexisting domestic and reproductive duties. As 
a result of these policies, labor migration became 
significant, yielding dependency on food imports as 
people failed to use remittances from South Africa 
to develop agriculture. In the 1940s and 50s, famine 
became increasingly common, and in 1965, Portugal 
enacted a ‘scorched earth’ policy along the Tanzanian 
border in its fight against FRELIMO supporters 
which often led to starvation.
At independence, FRELIMO assumed power 
and stifled all local trading, imposing a uniform 
policy of villagization and collective production that 
severely affected crop yields. It was through these 
policies, though, that FRELIMO hoped to invigorate 
industrial agriculture at the expense of peasant 
farming. This disruption was costly and ineffective, 
and made the urban population reliant on food 
produced through a centralized and mechanized 
system of production.
The time after independence also saw an 
unusual number of natural disasters. In 1977, the 
Limpopo and Incomati rivers flooded, damaging 
crops and livestock; in 1978, the Zambezi river also 
flooded, driving 220,000 people from their homes, 
and in 1979, Cyclone Justine damaged agriculture in 
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the north of the country. Prior to 1980, however, the 
government was largely able to curtail damage via 
a Department for the Prevention of Calamities and 
Natural Disasters. Through this organization, the 
government was able to mobilize resources to deal 
with the crises, including foreign aid.
Episodes of Food Scarcity
In 1980, three factors contributed to the sharp 
decline in food production and marketing. First 
were military tactics used by RENAMO fighters, 
which were directed towards infrastructure, and 
the population displacement that resulted. Second 
were official policies that restricted rural trade, 
established communal villages, and forcibly recruited 
urban jobless to rural labor programs in the north. 
The third factor was the weather, which in 1983-
84 “turned the economic disaster into widespread 
human tragedy.”119
During times of peace, Mozambique is a fertile 
country which has little trouble feeding its population 
and producing exports, agricultural and otherwise. 
Between 1983 and 1984, though, the south-central 
region of the country descended into famine, with 
most commonly cited statistics placing the death toll 
at around 100,000. A second major famine occurred 
in 1987, centered on the eastern Zambézia province, 
which was the result of conflict.
According to UNICEF, over 600,000 people 
perished during Mozambique’s decade-long period 
of intermittent famine—a toll that compares to 
Ethiopia’s famine of 1983-85. However, except for 
1983-84, there were not scenes of mass starvation. 
Instead, famine meant “chronic shortages of food 
and all consumer goods, constant insecurity and 
frequently homelessness, loss of assets such as 
livestock, and being forced to survive on a reduced 
diet of leaves and roots, and perhaps wild game, until 
it [became] possible to reach a food distribution 
center or plant and harvest a crop.”120
In the early 1980s, an unusually severe drought 
affected most of central and southern Mozambique, 
with the poorest families starting to suffer extreme 
hunger. In Tete Province, many died of complications 
related to the lack of available food, though the 
famine received no publicity. In Gaza and Inhambane 
provinces, where RENAMO was the most active, an 
estimated twenty-five percent of normally marketed 
crops were lost. In the following year, as RENAMO 
attacks began in earnest, 100,000 Mozambicans 
sought refuge in neighboring Zimbabwe.
International aid was slow to arrive, delayed 
until the crisis had already struck. In 1983, 
Zimbabwe (itself combatting famine) was the major 
food donor to Mozambique, and it was not until 
early 1984 that more food aid was sent. After 1984, 
though, Mozambique became massively dependent 
on foreign aid: “Food shortages became chronic 
and food became almost unobtainable on the 
official market.”121 Where food surpluses did exist, 
they were sold on the black market or bartered, 
and in provinces such as Gaza, the black market 
accounted for as much as half of food surpluses. By 
1986, harvests were down to roughly ten percent 
of 1981 levels. At the same time, Mozambique’s 
urban population increased as rural food insecurity 
deepened.
1985 and 1986 saw no reprieve from conflict 
and hunger, with a major RENAMO offensive in 
Zambézia Province in late 1986 coinciding with the 
planting season. After attacks began on roads, over 
500,000 were reported as ‘at risk’ from famine, and 
over 270,000 were displaced.
At the same time, there was a severe food 
shortage in the northern Niassa Province due to 
floods, poor harvests, and RENAMO activity, placing 
400,000 people at risk of famine. Additionally, 1986 
floods in the Zambezi Valley washed away a portion 
of Tete Province’s first harvests following three years 
of drought, placing around 500,000 at risk of a food 
shortage.
Around this time, famine spread to the south of 
the country, even reaching the outskirts of the capital, 
Maputo. In Maputo Province, 60 percent of the 
population faced serious food shortages in 1986, with 
another 22,000 displaced by RENAMO activity along 
the South African border. In Inhambane Province, 
about 38 percent of the population was described 
as at risk, and in Sofala Province, almost 1 million 
individuals were placed in danger by the war. Serious 
malnutrition was also reported in the Chibabwa area, 
where RENAMO burned maize.
Marginal recovery occurred in 1987, when 
agricultural production grew by seven percent, 
though around this time, famine struck in Zambézia, 
previously the country’s wealthiest and least famine-
prone province. While it is undeniable that many in 
Zambézia suffered hunger and destitution due to the 
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RENAMO occupation, the Mozambican Air Force’s 
counter-insurgency strategy, which included large-
scale population displacement, was also to blame.
Despite this, there is little evidence pointing 
to RENAMO or FAM creating famine as an end. 
Instead, “the basic military strategy of aiming to 
control the civilian population leads to famine as 
a direct and foreseeable consequence... The logic 
of war-created famine has not been one in which 
starvation is used to kill people, but one in which the 
threat of starvation is used to control people.”122
The abuse of food aid was also instrumental in 
maintaining famine conditions, with both RENAMO 
and FAM responsible for attacks on relief convoys 
and storehouses, as well as corrupt government 
officials and merchants systematically diverting large 
amounts of relief food.
Though famine was not a deliberate strategy, 
as one FAM officer explained, people were relocated 
“for their safety. Otherwise the bandits (RENAMO) 
would make them feed them. In remote areas we 
then destroy their fields—so the bandits will not 
become fat.”123 Between 1986 and 1988, 466 such 
‘accommodation camps’ were established, though 
many were more significant as “nodes of government 
control in a sea of insurgency”124 which could not 
be maintained without international aid. As a result, 
the government’s access to relief became one of its 
greatest assets in the war.
The only tangible evidence of government forces 
systematically destroying crops as a tactic of war 
comes from their 1987 counter-insurgency campaign 
in Zambézia. Assisted by units from Tanzania 
and special forces from Zimbabwe, the operation 
entailed large-scale population displacement from 
districts that had come under RENAMO control. 
The government’s scorched earth policy during these 
attacks directly contributed to the 1987 famine.
All of this is not to say that RENAMO did not 
commit similarly grave atrocities. An early South 
African training manual for RENAMO, which 
taught readers how to ambush, retreat, and spread 
propaganda, also “advised units to ‘live off the land’ 
by capturing supplies and destroying everything 
remaining so as to deny the enemies access to 
it.”125 RENAMO also targeted infrastructure in 
its campaigns, including railroads, bridges, trucks, 
shops, FRELIMO offices, clinics, and schools. In 1982 
alone, 140 villages were torched by RENAMO, and in 
1982-3, they destroyed 900 rural shops. In addition to 
its tangible effects, the destruction of infrastructure 
was also symbolic, “cleansing the area of government 
presence, providing an outlet for accumulated 
grievances of the populace, and returning the 
countryside to a subsistence condition.”126
However, one of the most devastating aspects 
of RENAMO’s campaign was the obstruction 
and diversion of relief. Between 1984 and 1987, 
RENAMO destroyed and damaged relief trucks, 
killed drivers, and stole or destroyed over 400 tons 
of food and relief supplies. Over half of these attacks 
occurred in 1987—a year which also saw some 
4,500,000 people face famine and the displacement of 
1,600,000 more. The destruction continued through 
1988, and in 1989, RENAMO launched attacks on 
a railway line, destroying over 2,000 tons of relief 
food.xxiv
Beyond this, however, it is difficult to generalize 
about RENAMO’s operations, with the treatment of 
populations under their control varying considerably. 
According to accounts of Mozambicans who 
experienced it, RENAMO’s administration can be 
categorized by geographical, logistical, and local 
political factors, with areas subject to ‘taxation,’ 
‘control,’ or ‘destruction’ modes of control. Given 
the fluidity of the insurgency, though, these 
categorizations are tenuous at best.
‘Taxation’ areas constituted much of RENAMO’s 
domain, and were used “to produce and services 
for the organization, with RENAMO frequently 
only imposing on the local population light tribute 
demands.”127 In ‘control’ areas, on the other hand, 
RENAMO attempted to establish health clinics, 
schools, and government institutions.xxv
When Zimbabwe fully entered the war in 1985, 
RENAMO was faced with the threat of air-based 
attacks. In response, larger bases were fragmented 
and moved to inaccessible locations. As areas came 
under military pressure, civilian food supplies 
dwindled considerably. By 1985-86, this had helped 
undermine RENAMO’s support among the local 
population.
Finally, Maputo and Gaza provinces were 
‘destruction’ zones, subject to “the seemingly wanton 
destruction of health, educational and economic 
xxiv  In 1991, a senior RENAMO official confirmed the role of food in their 
strategy: “Food is a tool of war, we use it to make strategic gains, but so do the 
FRELIMO Marxists!” (Karl Maier, 1992).
xxv  In most cases, though, these were nothing more than poor replicas of the 
system RENAMO had previously destroyed.
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infrastructure, and food stores and food convoys.”128 
From these areas, for example, came four reports one 
year of aid vehicles being destroyed, rather than first 
removing the cargo. Empty trucks were also targeted 
on occasion, further hampering the government’s 
relief efforts.
 These displays of dominance, then, were 
dramatic indicators of RENAMO’s destructive 
capacity, signifying a “deliberate and effective weapon 
of war. [This conspicuous destruction] sends a very 
vivid message to the thousands of hungry deslocados 
(displaced people) waiting for food relief to arrive in 
their accommodation centers and is very effective in 
eroding morale.”129 In some instances, these displays 
of power signaled to the population a choice between 
RENAMO and starvation. Thus, in the end, food 
security all but dictated military strategy.
After the death of Samora Machel, 
Mozambique’s President, in a 1986 plane crash, 
Joaquim Chissano, his successor, implemented 
sweeping economic and political changes. In addition 
to transforming the country from Marxism to 
capitalism, Chissano successfully carried out peace 
talks with RENAMO, bringing the civil war to an end 
in 1992. Around this time, a new constitution was 
rated that created a multi-party political system, a 
market-based economy, and free elections. By 1993, 
more than 1,500,000 Mozambican refugees returned 
from neighboring countries in one of Africa’s largest 
repatriation efforts.130
Press
Throughout Mozambique’s civil war, there 
were many human rights violations. Even since 
the cessation of hostilities, there have there been 
many concerns regarding infringements of the press 
and other civil liberties, although the country has 
improved in recent years. Consequently, during the 
1980s, Mozambique’s press was rated as ‘Not Free’ by 
Freedom House.
ETHIOPIA 
Political Regime and Elections
Unlike other countries in this study, Ethiopia 
was never colonized by a European power. In 
1974, though, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie 
I was brought to an end when he was deposed by 
a Marxist-Leninist military junta known as the 
‘Dergue’ (“committee” or “council” in Ge’ez). Led by 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, the junta established a one-
party communist state after assuming power.
Institutions of Famine Prevention
Prior to 1974, there had been little successful 
protest action, and no urban food riots. Indeed, the 
early stages of the revolution were relatively non-
violent. De Waal notes that at this time, Ethiopia was 
(on paper, at least) better equipped to prevent famine 
than ever in its history. Rather, “the shortcoming 
was that while the famine played a role in the 
revolution, the famine-vulnerable people did not.”131 
After the revolution, reforms were imposed from 
above, making tenuous the gains of the revolution, 
and causing the government to struggle with its 
legitimacy.
During the power struggle that followed the 
revolution—the ‘Red Terror’—extractive policies 
were implemented to sustain the ever-increasing 
army. Around this time, a central food extraction 
institution was also established, though in practice 
the corporation simply supplied food to a few select 
cities—the same pattern of distribution as under the 
Emperor.
Overall, the Dergue’s economic policies 
had disastrous consequences that caused mass 
impoverishment and were partly to blame for the 
scope of the country’s 1983-85 famine. While the 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), an 
anti-famine bureau established in the final years of 
the Empire, once produced comprehensive analyses 
of poverty and famine in Ethiopia, by the 1980s, 
the RRC had become compromised as a tool of the 
Dergue.
Tasked with collectivizing Ethiopia’s workforce 
and procuring foreign assistance, the RRC was 
very successful in securing aid, though much of 
the food was used to supply militias (especially in 
Eritrea and Tigray). Elsewhere, the RRC “pushed 
international agencies to set up relief programmes in 
surplus-producing regions, where the [government] 
continued to collect substantial quotas.”132 The 
RRC was also instrumental in spreading propaganda 
which framed the 1980s famine as resulting from 
overpopulation and drought, downplayed the role of 
war, and claimed that all victims were being reached 
by it and other aid organizations. However, despite 
these distorted claims, the RRC never interrupted the 
flow of early warning information, which could have 
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inhibited its ability to procure aid.
Press
During the country’s 1973-75 famine, Emperor 
Selassie suppressed information about the situation, 
and it was not until a newsreel aired on Canadian 
television that the international community began 
to respond.133 After the explosion of international 
attention, Ethiopia’s government sought to restrict 
foreign media and relief agencies, though this only 
drew more attention. The revolutionary Dergue 
used this attention to their advantage, culminating 
with the creation of a UN Office for Emergency 
Operations in Ethiopia (UNEOE). Though intended 
to be an authoritative source of information, the 
office deliberately obscured information, including 
their own reports.
During the Eighth Offensive, a domestic 
military operation launched in February 1985, the 
UNEOE did not mention any offenses, even those 
that involved direct attacks on relief operations. 
They consistently downplayed reports of forcible 
resettlement, rebutted independent research, and 
even appealed for aid at resettlement sites.
Thus, not only did the government’s control 
over media serve to veil its repressive military 
actions, but it was also able to influence the 
content of news that was released. This allowed the 
government of Ethiopia to exploit the international 
humanitarian community for aid through its own 
channels as well as through the UNEOE, while 
simultaneously engaging in continued domestic 
conflict.
Episodes of Food Scarcity
While many speak of ‘the Ethiopian famine’ 
as a homogeneous national phenomenon, this is 
misleading. This image, though, allowed the RRC to 
claim that it had been predicting the 1983-85 famine 
as early as 1981. In reality, many of those affected 
were in one section of the country, afflicted by a 
wholly different crisis that was precipitated by the 
Dergue’s war with various ethnic groups. Further 
doubt is cast on the RRC’s claims when one considers 
the unreliability of local statistics at that time. As late 
as early 1984, no one could truly have predicted the 
famine, with food production estimated as above 
average for 1981 and 1982 (see Table 7).
It was not until February 1983, when “destitute 
migrants [turned] up at feeding centers,” that signs 
of famine began to arise.134 International NGOs 
began appeals for aid, and the RRC quickly revised its 
assessment and claimed a major production shortfall, 
retroactively identifying drought to cover destruction 
wrought by government forces.
Though the country’s 1983 harvest was far from 
disastrous, famine occurred in the northern province 
of Tigray. In 1984, the short rains failed, and the 
RRC played up the incident as causing catastrophic 
famine, though it was not until the main harvest of 
1984 that severe drought spread to the eastern and 
southern parts of the country.xxvi Though not nearly 
as prolonged or severe as the famine in the north, the 
figures were conflated in government statistics, giving 
the impression that the entire country was suffering 
from a unitary crisis.
While drought and harvest failure contributed 
to the famine, neither they nor the government’s 
economic and agricultural policies can be considered 
direct causes of the famine. Rather, the country’s 
famine was principally caused by the government’s 
counter-insurgency campaign in Tigray and Wollo: 
“The zone of severe famine coincided with the 
war zone, and the phases of the developing famine 
corresponded with major military actions.”135 Five 
elements of Ethiopia’s counter-insurgency strategy in 
particular helped catalyze famine: military offensives 
aimed at rebel strongholds in surplus-producing 
regions, the bombing of markets in rebel-held areas, 
severe restrictions on trade and movement, forced 
population resettlements, and the manipulation of 
relief programs.
Until early 1984, international donors were 
(justifiably) skeptical of the Ethiopian government’s 
appeals for relief amidst mounting evidence that 
diversion and abuse of aid were employed as tactics 
in counter-insurgency efforts. In October 1984, 
however, the famine was thrust into the international 
media spotlight. Though this mobilized some, 
others felt the exposure resulted from collusion 
between private relief agencies and television 
broadcasters.xxvii Western governments’ priorities at 
the time were simply to avoid embarrassment, such 
xxvi  A less partial indicator of famine is the price of grain, which was 
consistently high in eastern and central Tigray, with elevated prices rippling 
outwards following the 1984 harvest failure (see Table 8). Rainfall data from 
the time corroborates this theory, with localized droughts occurring in 1983 
alongside above-average rainfall in other areas.
xxvii  In addition, the broadcast aired during prime fundraising season for 
relief agencies, causing NGOs to compete for media exposure.
37
accountability without democracy: lessons from african famines in the 1980s
that “aid became a strategic alibi.”136
In response, the Ethiopian Government sought 
to restrict media and relief agencies, drawing further 
attention to the situation. However, the Dergue soon 
began to use the relief presence to their advantage 
with the creation of a UN Office for Emergency 
Operations in Ethiopia (UNOEOE). The office’s 
purported mission was to coordinate relief efforts 
with the Ethiopian Government and to centralize 
the flow of information, though these functions 
were already served by other organizations. This left 
the UNOEOE, de Waal notes, to help maintain the 
appearance of competent action towards the famine 
without antagonizing the Dergue.
Nonetheless, the official UN view was that the 
agency enabled a broader and more effective response 
force. The Ethiopian Government intensified its 
actions (the creation of famine and manipulation of 
aid), and the UNOEOE acted as its mouthpiece, with 
journalists frequently turning to it as an authority 
on the topic. Rather than investigating abuses, 
though, the UNOEOE “consistently concealed 
disturbing evidence, including evidence produced 
by its own monitors.”137 In the same month as the 
establishment of the UNOEOE, for example, the 
Dergue launched a ‘silent offensive’ in Eritrea, so 
named for its lack of publicity.
The one international agency to withdraw from 
the country in protest was Doctors Without Borders 
(MSF), who departed soon before the government 
ordered their expulsion. MSF later published a 
damning report of the situation, though this only 
caused other organizations to discredit them on the 
basis of incompetency.xxviii Thus, the relationship 
between international humanitarian actors, the 
media, and the Ethiopian government greatly 
impeded any systematic evaluation of the famine. 
Following a UNOEOE report on Tigrayan 
garrison towns that dramatically overstated the 
proportion of people receiving satisfactory rations, 
the US government was forced to become an 
accomplice in the cover-up. Days earlier, the US 
Congress requested that President Reagan determine 
whether Ethiopia had used starvation as a weapon 
of war, a tactic that would have provoked the US to 
take action. While the Presidential Determination 
xxviii  Though its ineptitude was not the cause of its expulsion, it is not 
inconceivable that MSF was politically naïve: “its field staff were unaware of 
the implications of reporting on what they had seen, and had they been more 
experienced they would have followed their colleagues in other agencies and 
remained silent” (de Waal, 1997).
ultimately argued that the Dergue’s policies “have no 
doubt caused vast unnecessary suffering including 
starvation,” there was no evidence of deliberative 
use of starvation at that time (a qualifier that 
allowed Mengistu’s administration to escape further 
scrutiny).138 
The US also felt pressure domestically to 
continue providing humanitarian assistance: 
following popular aid concert events in England and 
America, it became a priority to be seen as giving 
generously. Because media and politicians were 
prohibited from visiting rebel-held areas, “it was 
necessary for US assistance to have a high media 
profile in government-held areas,” depoliticizing the 
famine and allowing the Dergue to exploit the media 
presence.xxix, 139
Among areas of Tigray held by the Tigrayan 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the greatest 
force against famine was the political relationship 
between civilians and the TPLF, who believed that 
the peasantry was crucial to succeed in revolution. 
As the TPLF began to undertake more quasi-
governmental programs, it continued to involve the 
rural population. The TPLF had drawn support from 
peasants since its inception, so their political contract 
had become enforceable. Had the TPLF lacked the 
support of the locals, it would have been crushed 
militarily.xxx
As the war and food crises intensified, the TPLF 
xxix  A convenient scapegoat for the famine was found in the natural 
environment, the tropes of which are familiar: drought, overpopulation, and 
unsustainable land-use practices. ‘Saving’ the environment became a popular 
nonpolitical way for Western (particularly American) donors to send aid to 
communist Ethiopia.
xxx  The TPLF also established a relief administration with the face of an 
independent NGO, though in practice it was “virtually indistinguishable from 
the civil administration of the front” (de Waal, 1997).
Table 8: Relative Food Production in Ethiopia, 1977-84 
 Production 
Year Total Per Capita 
1977 99 95 
1978 110 104 
1979 122 113 
1980 117 106 
1981 115 102 
1982 127 110 
1983 118 99 
1984 110 90 
NOTE: 1974-6 = 100 (de Waal, 1991) 
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also shifted its focus to economic and social policies 
over military action. These policies, including wage 
employment, money lending, and trading, helped to 
greatly reduce variability in individual purchasing 
power, and further promoted the idea of the TPLF as 
a governing force.
Ultimately, de Waal concludes, Ethiopia’s 
famines of the 1970s and 80s are “replete with 
ironies, which are explicable only by attention to 
the existence or not of an anti-famine political 
contract.”140 While the failed response to the 
1973 famine was “highly intellectual, elitist and 
institutionalized,”141 the response to the 1983-85 
famine was, for a time, thought of as a major policy 
success for the government of Ethiopia. At the same 
time, the TPLF largely did not receive recognition for 
its productive efforts.
SUDAN 
Political Regime and Elections
Prior to its independence in 1956, Sudan was 
under the purview of the British, who allowed 
the establishment of a democratic parliament 
following a series of polls. At independence, de 
Waal notes, Sudan exhibited two structures that 
“stood as guarantees against localized food shortages 
degenerating into famine (in the North at least).”142 
The first was a civil service with a reputation for 
professionalism, which tasked itself with safeguarding 
local food supplies, and the second was the system of 
‘native administration’ of villages and sub-districts.
However, the situation was undermined by 
political instability in the form of multiple coup 
attempts, the migration of many of the country’s 
professionals, and the failure of Sudan’s ‘open 
door’ strategy for attracting foreign investment. 
Additionally, there was rampant corruption under 
the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, who seized power in 
1969. As a result, Sudan defaulted on its foreign 
debts, causing Nimeiri to appeal to international 
lending and aid organizations, and to invoke a 
spirit of ‘national reconciliation.’ In practice, this 
meant abandoning political alliances with secular 
professionals as well as the South, and Nimeiri’s rule 
“became characterized by an embrace of political 
Islam and deepening economic dependence.”143 
At this time, the country’s legal system began a 
process of ‘Islamization,’ with the appointment of a 
prominent Sudanese Muslim Brothers member to the 
post of Attorney General.
Over time, prominent secularists and religious 
leaders left the regime, and the situation in the South 
degenerated into civil war. In an attempt to legitimize 
his government’s use of political Islam, Nimeiri 
declared Islamic law in 1983 and proclaimed himself 
Imam. In so doing, however, he made the claim that 
he was accountable only to Allah, eliminating any 
remaining shred of commitment to popular welfare. 
By this point, Sudan was experiencing a massive 
influx of remittances; the country was also deeply 
indebted to foreign governments. As a result, the 
government became significantly less accountable 
to its internal tax base, and “instead [relied] 
on the apparently magical liquidity of Islamist 
financiers.”144 Meanwhile, capitalist investors began 
to withdraw, and Islamic banks and merchants began 
to invest, “exploiting their tax privileges, political 
connections and access to hard currency.”145
Institutions of Famine Prevention
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Sudan’s 
renowned system of local government began to 
decay. Inflation devalued government salaries, 
and many civil servants joined the migration of 
professionals to the Gulf States. Corruption was 
widespread, and experiments in regional governance 
fostered factionalism, further lowering morale.
During the 1980s, Sudan became a strategic 
player in the Cold War, and was seen as key to the 
anti-communist strategy after it changed alliances 
from East to West. Despite the country’s massive 
offshore debt, Nimeiri exploited this position 
to receive more foreign aid, making Sudan the 
recipient of the most US foreign assistance in sub-
Saharan Africa (over $1.4 billion throughout the 
decade). However, this foreign assistance, combined 
with multiple debt reschedulings, served only to 
Table 9: Average Grain Prices in Northern Ethiopia, 1981-85 
 Province 
Season E. Tigray N. Wollo N. Gondar 
Nov/Dec 1981 100 50 40 
Nov/Dec 1982 165 65 55 
Nov/Dec 1983 225 90 45 
Nov/Dec 1984 300 160 70 
Jun/Jul 1985 380 235 165 
(de Waal, 1997) 
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prolong the country’s impending economic crisis. 
The management of Sudan’s debt was such that “by 
1984, Nimeiri’s treasury was living from hand to 
mouth.”146 Eventually, the country defaulted on 
its debt to the IMF, making Nimeiri accountable 
primarily to financiers in Washington.
Around this time, reforms demanded by the US 
and IMF included the “widespread privatization of 
nationalized corporations and the radical slimming 
down of the state budget.”147 These were welcomed 
by Islamist merchants, to whom it provided greater 
leeway for investment. At the same time, more 
non-state actors began to become involved in the 
reconstruction of southern Sudan, following the 1972 
peace agreement. Unlike before, though, foreign 
aid was now being channeled to foreign NGOs over 
whom the Sudanese Government had no control.
Press
The Library of Congress reports that since the 
country’s independence, Sudan’s mass media has 
largely served to disseminate information supporting 
various political parties or official government 
views (depending on the power structure at the 
time). Radio has “remained virtually a government 
monopoly, and television broadcasting [has] 
been a complete monopoly.”148 Freedom House 
corroborates, awarding Sudan scores of zero (‘Not 
Free’) for print and broadcast freedom until 1987, 
when print media gained some freedom.
In the end, the famine in the South failed to 
become a political scandal in Sudan. In addition to 
a lack of interest by political groups in the North, 
northern journalists rarely covered the crisis, which 
would have meant traveling to an active war zone and 
challenging security restrictions. Equally important, 
though, was the lack of significant interest among 
readers: “Apart from the English language Sudan 
Times (edited by a Southerner), only the Communist 
al Meidan showed an interest, and that was largely 
connected to the political implications of the 
militias.”149
Though press freedom plainly “did not exist” 
under Nimeiri, the Library of Congress notes 
that under Mahdi, Sudan had numerous political 
newsletters, as well as independent newspapers 
and magazines.150 Following the coup by the 
Revolutionary Command Council for National 
Salvation, all newspapers were banned.
Episodes of Food Scarcity
In 1983, the specter of famine loomed as 
drought reduced food production by seventy-five 
percent in north Kordofan, north Darfur, and the 
Red Sea Hills. Local governments attempted to 
distribute relief, but were restrained by tight budgets 
and meager stores.xxxi
Rains failed again during the summer of 1984, 
and conditions became increasingly desperate. Apart 
from a (largely symbolic) declaration of emergency 
in Darfur, however, no action was taken by the 
government. There were mass migrations to towns 
and cities, including Khartoum, but around this time 
children in rural areas began to die.
Though Nimeiri felt himself accountable 
only to Allah, in reality he had actual or potential 
financiers as well, to whom “the drought and famine 
were an embarrassment and a distraction.”151 In an 
attempt to persuade international donors that Sudan 
was stable and a good recipient of aid, Sudan was 
forced to deny classifying the troubles in the South 
as war. Because the conflict was not ‘war,’ militias 
were mobilized instead of the army. Similarly, the 
government did not admit to famine, which would 
have shaken investors’ confidence.
In the end, Nimeiri’s strategy for averting 
famine was simply to deny that any problem 
existed. In November 1984 he said publicly, “The 
situation with respect to food security and health 
is reassuring;” it was not until January 1985 that he 
admitted to the reality of the situation.152 By this 
point, though, it had been a full year since drought 
became apparent, and an estimated 250,000 had 
perished.
The famine did help solidify a broad coalition 
against Nimeiri, led by professionals, including 
doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. In November 
1984, the Ministry of Health broke ranks and 
published an honest report of the famine conditions. 
Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture 
released estimates of relief needed that contradicted 
those released by Nimeiri. The famine also divided 
the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the single 
political party at the time. With the defection of 
Sudan’s largest city, there began the formation of 
an urban-rural alliance that would overthrow the 
xxxi  By early 1984, the FAO estimated the relief needed in Darfur at 39,000 
metric tons. Khartoum cut the figure to 7,000 metric tons, and even less was 
delivered. Nothing was sent to Kordofan.
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government.xxxii
In April 1985, there was a popular uprising 
by democratic forces. While the fall of Nimeiri 
was a “triumph of the politicization of famine,” the 
coalition which formed to overthrow him was fragile, 
and its use of famine largely tactical, such that in the 
end, no robust anti-famine political contract would 
emerge.153
Perhaps the most blatant example of political 
opportunism during the famine, though, was “the 
rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which 
used its radio broadcasts to chastise the government 
for inaction over the famine, while the SPLA itself 
was helping to create famine in the south.”154 After 
the fall of Nimeiri, many who once mobilized against 
the famine lost interest, and the political agenda 
shifted. By this point, interest in overcoming the 
drought came only from those still affected by it.
Immediately after the fall of Nimeiri, Dr. Al-
Jazuli Daf ’allah, became interim prime minister 
and promptly delegated responsibility for relief 
to international agencies (in light of Sudan’s 
now-bankrupt economy). In addition to helping 
depoliticize famine, this solidified the crisis as 
within the domain of relief organizations, rather 
than being owned by the democratic forces behind 
the uprising—famine prevention became an 
internationalized technical issue, rather than a 
(domestic) political one. This shift was reflected in 
the establishment of an early warning system that 
monitored economic, climatic, and agricultural data, 
reflecting “the neo-liberal agenda for eviscerating 
government responsibilities.”155
In 1986, democratic elections returned to 
Sudan, though they were spread over a twelve-day 
period and delayed in thirty-seven constituencies due 
to the civil war. After the elections, Sadiq al-Mahdi 
and the Umma Party assumed power. During this 
time:
Sudan enjoyed all the institutions of liberal 
democracy, at least in Khartoum and other urban 
centers. The press was uncensored and vigorous, 
and often highly critical of the government. 
Political parties, trade unions and professional 
associations were free to mobilize. There was no 
suspicion of fraud in the elections. The judiciary 
was independent and on several occasions 
overruled government decisions.156
It is arguable, though, that this liberalism was “as 
xxxii  Omdurman, population 526,284 in 1983.
much a reflection of the weakness of government as 
of a true spirit of tolerance; but the freedoms were 
genuine and were used by, among others, human 
rights activists.”157
At the same time, this period saw the most 
severe famine in Sudan’s modern history. In the 
South, famine was caused by the ongoing civil 
war. The government endorsed proxy militias to 
conduct raids, which were frequent, widespread, 
and devastating. Livestock were stolen, villages were 
destroyed, wells were poisoned, and people were 
killed indiscriminately. Militias were also implicated 
in the capture and enslavement of civilians. Those 
who managed to escape fled to garrison towns, where 
they were forced to sell their labor and assets cheaply, 
and were often prohibited from moving farther 
north, where there was the possibility of work or 
charity.
Local government officials and army 
commanders also prevented relief assistance from 
reaching displaced people, and an estimated 30,000 
people died in Western Sudanese displacement 
camps that year. Localized famines were also created 
by the military, whose tactics included raiding and 
scorched earth.
Due to the militias’ connections to Sadiq’s 
Umma Party, a war economy eventually developed, 
with a vested interest in the conflict’s continuation. 
Additionally, for some politicians, merchants, and 
officers, the violence, famine, and failure of relief 
represented a policy success.
Despite this, though, there is little evidence 
that points to a strategic plan to use the famine as a 
weapon of genocide. Instead, the “moral, political 
and economic logic of the war as interpreted in 
Khartoum created a space where such near-genocidal 
motives and practices could flourish”158
The South was not only a war zone, but also 
an area with no legitimate political authority, which 
allowed state agents to act with impunity. This 
‘abolition of restraint’ did not develop automatically, 
of course, but was the result of state and local politics: 
“Khartoum still had clients and allies in the South, 
whom it had to mollify, and who had power bases 
in their own right. But in Khartoum, the famine 
was virtually invisible.”159 At the same time, the 
Sadiq government was exceptionally sensitive to 
the demands of Northern constituents, especially 
those from urban areas, and established a subsidy on 
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wheat that was prohibitively expensive (equivalent 
to roughly 7 percent of government revenue). The 
insistence by the IMF to remove this subsidy in 
March 1985 helped contribute to the downfall of 
Nimeiri, and while Sudan’s donors insisted it should 
be further cut or abolished, Sadiq refused to touch 
it, despite other agreed-upon austerity measures. 
Even the mention of cutting the wheat subsidy drew 
crowds in the streets, such that “all government 
finance was hostage to this single issue,” as well as 
reducing the government’s accountability to a single, 
limited constituency.160
In the end, Sudan’s famine failed to become a 
political scandal as interest waned among journalists 
and the general public. The SPLA also proved an 
obstacle to the peace process, placing military 
victory over political mobilization. At best, the 
SPLA represented ‘benevolent paternalism,’ while 
at worst, it was violent and extractive. Tactics used 
by the force created food shortages in many areas 
by requisitioning food, labor, and livestock, and 
exacerbating shortages in others. Garrison towns 
were reduced to starvation, and relief supplies were 
consistently blocked, inhibiting efforts by Northern 
politicians to build anti-famine alliances with affected 
populations.
A glimmer of hope for relief came following 
widespread floods in August 1988, when “there 
was criticism from all quarters over corruption and 
favoritism in the distribution of relief,” but as the 
issue was gaining attention, the ruling coalition 
collapsed following a dispute regarding Sharia 
law.161 The 1988 peace accords between the SPLA 
and the Democratic Union Party (DUP), the second 
largest political party, made no mention of famine 
or famine relief, and it was only later in the year 
that Western donors took up the cause. By the 
end of 1988, pressure from Danish and American 
governments yielded Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS), a plan proposed, designed, and implemented 
almost exclusively by international relief agencies.
Ultimately, political liberalism was unable 
to substantially alter the lines of accountability 
established in the final years of Nimeiri’s regime. 
The exclusivism of the government combined with 
a lack of significant opposition and an emphasis 
on international assistance contributed to an 
environment hostile to any democratic institutions 
that would provide protection from famine. 
Additionally, the government was only sensitive to its 
urban constituents, and there was no urban-rural or 
North-South coalition that could promote broader 
accountability.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE AFRICAN 
CASES
I have argued that while Amartya Sen’s theory 
that a free press and competitive elections would 
allow a country to avert famine is not entirely 
accurate, its underlying causal mechanism is 
valid. However, press freedom and competitive 
elections are by no means the only mechanisms of 
accountability that could prompt a government to 
take action to avert famine.
By examining Sen’s cases—Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan—as well as 
Mozambique and Uganda (thus completing the set of 
all African countries that experienced famine during 
the 1980s, I argue that although the causality is valid, 
in most cases, countries’ famine prevention efforts 
were not motivated solely by freedom of the press 
or competitive elections. Moreover, the presence of 
either institution in a country does not guarantee the 
prevention or aversion of famine conditions. In some 
cases, the domestic press prompted a government’s 
response to famine, while in other instances it was 
the international media that exposed a crisis. Yet, 
in other cases, action was not taken despite a free 
press, reflecting either a lack of incentive to report 
food shortages or a lack of political imperative to 
act on the information. Thus, while a free press is, if 
anything, likely to expedite famine response efforts, it 
is by no means necessary or sufficient. Additionally, 
while representative politics are generally considered 
necessary to align the interests of politicians with the 
voting population, they are by no means sufficient.
Beyond raising questions of what factors are 
sufficient to prompt a response to famine, this finding 
challenges the necessity of a representative form of 
government for such an effort: in all institutional 
forms of government, the key political incentive—
maintaining power—remains the same.
De Waal answers this by noting that despite 
the existence of other accountability-promoting 
institutions, the press and elections may be used by 
people to sanction elected politicians for past actions, 
while simultaneously projecting a (vague) image 
of desired political action. In this way, a contract 
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is formed which indicates to those in 
power the importance of a particular 
cause, such as preventing famine. 
In a liberal political system, various 
mechanisms can afford this ability, 
while under an authoritarian regime, 
the people’s only recourse is protest, 
peaceful or armed.
However, as with famine versus 
chronic hunger, the threshold of an 
anti-famine political contract versus a 
commitment is less than clear, and, more 
importantly, of questionable relevance. 
First, in reality, there is no perfect 
means of enforcement in representative 
politics, and so there can be no ‘pure’ 
manifestation of a political contract. 
Second, while the preconditions 
for a contract are the same as for a 
commitment, the latter seems little more than an 
impermanent version of the former; the two can only 
be distinguished in retrospect.
More significantly, though, is the scope of 
a contract, both in terms of the parties involved 
and the content of the agreement. While an anti-
famine political contract includes the government, 
the people, and famine, in theory, variation in each 
may lead to ‘impure’ contracts and possibly famine 
conditions. In Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Kenya, for 
example, an anti-famine contract may be claimed 
to have existed, though only for a specific portion 
of the population (i.e. a greater disparity between 
the selectorate and the winning coalition).xxxiii,162 
Additionally, while an agreement (be it a contract 
or some other pact) between a state and the people 
may entail the prevention of famine conditions, 
the government may be free from addressing more 
fundamental causes, such as structural poverty or 
vulnerability to food insecurity, a pattern observed in 
Kenya in 1984.
Ultimately, freedom of the press and the 
regulation, competitiveness, and openness of 
elections cannot be considered panaceas for the 
prevention of famine. While these mechanisms 
of accountability are undeniably important to 
improving the quality of governance, they must be 
xxxiii  In terms of selectorate theory, this scenario would result from a 
disparity between the selectorate, “the set of people who have an institutional 
say in choosing leaders,” and the winning coalition, “the minimal set of people 
whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power.” (Mesquita 
et al., 2002)
delinked both from specific issues and from the 
political will to take action.






Number of Seats 
in Sudanese 
Constituent Assembly 
Upper Nile 1,000 3,000 7 
Bahr el Ghazal 2,000 4,000 9 
Darfur 51,000 — 43 
Kordofan 107,000 20,000 43 
Eastern 35,000 35,000 31 
Northern 2,400 1,000 20 
Central 18,000 6,000 55 
Khartoum 2,000 1,000 34 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table 11: Polity IV Executive Recruitment Concepts and Component Variables
Polity IV
Concept Brief Description
Polity IV Component Variables
XRREG XRCOMP XROPEN
(1) Ascription Succession bybirthright Regulated (3) Selection (1) Closed (1)
(2) Dual Executive: 
Ascription
& Designation 
Ascriptive and designated rulers 
coexist Regulated (3) Selection (1) Dual-Des. (2)
(3) Designation Informal competition from within an elite Transition (2) Selection (1) Open (4)
(4) Self-Selection Self-selection byseizure of power Unregulated (1) N/A (0) N/A (0)
(5) Gradual Transition from Self-Selection Transition (2) N/A (0) N/A (0)
(6) Dual Executive: 
Ascription
& Election
Ascriptive and elective rulers 
coexist Regulated (3) Transition (2) Dual-Elec. (3)
(7) Transitional or Restricted Election Transition (2) Transition (2) Open (4)
(8) Competitive 
Election
Formal competition among 
publicly supported candidates Regulated (3) Election (3) Open (4)
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Table 12: POLITY Scores for All African Countries
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Algeria -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -2
Angola -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Benin -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Botswana 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7
Burkina Faso -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Burundi -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Cameroon -8 -8 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Cape Verde -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
CAR -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Comoros -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Congo B -8 -8 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Congo K -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Côte d’Ivoire -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Djibouti -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Egypt -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6
Eq. Guinea -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Ethiopia -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Gabon -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Gambia 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Ghana 6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Guinea-Bissau -7 -7 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Guinea -9 -9 -9 -9 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Kenya -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Lesotho -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Liberia -7 -7 -7 -7 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6
Libya -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Madagascar -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6
Malawi -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Mali -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Mauritania -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Mauritius 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Morocco -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8
Mozambique -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7 -7 -7
Niger -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Nigeria 7 7 7 7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -5
Rwanda -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Senegal -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Sierra Leone -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Somalia -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Sudan -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -88 7 7 7 -7
Swaziland -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Tanzania -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6
Togo -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Tunisia -9 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -5 -5 -5
Uganda 3 3 3 3 3 -77 -7 -7 -7 -7
Zambia -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Zimbabwe 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 -6 -6 -6
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Table 13: XRREG Scores for All African Countries
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Algeria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Angola 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Benin 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Botswana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Burkina 
Faso 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Burundi 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1  1
Cameroon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Cape Verde 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
CAR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 1 1 1 1  1
Comoros 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Congo B 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Congo K 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Côte 
d’Ivoire 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Djibouti 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Eq. Guinea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Ethiopia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Gabon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Gambia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Ghana 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Guinea-
Bissau 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Guinea 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1  1
Kenya 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Lesotho 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1  1
Liberia 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2  2
Libya 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Madagascar 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Malawi 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Mali 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Mauritania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Mauritius 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Morocco 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Mozambique 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Niger 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Nigeria 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1  1
Rwanda 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Senegal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Sierra Leone 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Somalia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Sudan 2 2 2 2 2 -88 3 3 3  1
Swaziland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Tanzania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Togo 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Tunisia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Uganda 2 2 2 2 2 -77 1 1 1  1
Zambia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Zimbabwe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
46
columbia university journal of politics & society
Table 14: XRCOMP Scores for All African Countries
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Angola 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Botswana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Cameroon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Cape Verde 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 0 0 0 0  0
Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Congo B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Congo K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Côte d’Ivoire 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Djibouti 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Eq. Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Ethiopia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Gabon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Gambia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Ghana 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Guinea-
Bissau 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Guinea 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  0
Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Lesotho 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  0
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Madagascar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Malawi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Mauritania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Mauritius 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  1
Nigeria 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0  0
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Senegal 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Sierra Leone 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
South Africa 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  3
Sudan 1 1 1 1 1 -88 3 3 3  0
Swaziland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Tanzania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Uganda 2 2 2 2 2 -77 0 0 0  0
Zambia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1
Zimbabwe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1  2
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Table 15: XROPEN Scores for All African Countries
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Algeria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Angola 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Botswana 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Cameroon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Cape Verde 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Chad -77 -77 -77 -77 -88 0 0 0 0  0
Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Congo B 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Congo K 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Côte d’Ivoire 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Djibouti 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Egypt 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Eq. Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Ethiopia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Gabon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Gambia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Ghana 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Guinea-
Bissau 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Guinea 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0  0
Kenya 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Lesotho 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0 0  0
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Madagascar 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Malawi 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Mauritania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Mauritius 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Morocco 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Mozambique 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4  4
Nigeria 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0  0
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Senegal 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Sierra Leone 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Sudan 4 4 4 4 4 -88 4 4 4  0
Swaziland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  2
Tanzania 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0
Tunisia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Uganda 4 4 4 4 4 -77 0 0 0  0
Zambia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
Zimbabwe 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4
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Table 16: Press Freedom Scores for All African Countries (Press/Broadcast)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Algeria  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  1
Angola  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Benin  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Botswana  2/1  2/1  2/1  2/1  2/1  2/1  2/1 1  2/1  2
Burkina 
Faso  1/1  1/1  1/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  1/1  0
Burundi  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Cameroon  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Cape Verde  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  1/0 0  0/0  0
CAR  1/1  1/1  1/1  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  1/1  0
Chad  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Comoros  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Congo B  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Congo K  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/0  0
Côte 
d’Ivoire  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/1  1/1  1/1 1  1/0  1
Egypt  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Eq. Guinea  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Ethiopia  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Gabon  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2 1  2/2  2
Gambia  1/1  1/1  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  1/1  0
Ghana  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Guinea-
Bissau  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Guinea  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  0/0 0  1/0  0
Kenya  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  0/0 0  1/1  0
Lesotho  0/0  0/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  0/0  0
Liberia  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Libya  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Madagascar  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Malawi  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Mali  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Mauritania  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/2  2/1  2/1 2  2/2  2
Mauritius  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/0  0
Morocco  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Mozambique  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Niger  2/1  2/1  2/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1 2  2/1  1
Nigeria  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1  1/1 1  1/1  1
Senegal  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Sierra Leone  0/0  0/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  0/0  0
Somalia  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
South Africa  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/0  1
Sudan  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  1/0  1/0 1  0/0  0
Swaziland  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Tanzania  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Togo  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  0/0  0
Tunisia  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/0  1
Uganda  1/1  0/0  0/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/1  0
Zambia  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0  1/0 0  1/0  0
Zimbabwe  1/0  1/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0  0/0 0  1/0  0
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